Only for special people… like YOU!

Are you tired of all the cookie-cutter advertisement sites for someone’s stupid e-book about paranormal powers or making money or what have you? You know the kind, the ones that have highlighting, biiig headers, and keep droning on and on about how wonderful the book is and how it has helped everyone. Well, here’s a funny satire of them. It’s called Buy My Stupid EBook!!!

Do you like money? If so, we’re soulmates. But there are other people out there who also like money, and if you don’t buy my stupid eBook, they’re going to have it all and you won’t! Wouldn’t that suck?

Thank goodness you found my stupid eBook. I’m going to introduce you to an opportunity so lucrative I have to use ass-ugly fonts. This isn’t one of those other eBooks by total posers who can’t back their offers up. You can tell I’m serious because I use lots of exclamation points!!!!!!!!

Proudhon on… the moral sense.

Continuing my Proudhon quotes, here is Proudhon’s discussion of the moral sense, as well as the difference between human beings and other animals.

***

Le droit est l’ensemble des principes qui régissent la société; la justice, dans l’homme, est le respect et l’observation de ces principes. Pratiquer la justice, c’est obéir à l’instinct social; faire un acte de justice, c’est faire un acte de société. Si donc nous observons la conduite des hommes entre eux dans un certain nombre de circonstances différentes, il nous sera facile de reconnaître quand ils font société et quand ils ne font pas société; le résultat nous donnera, par induction, la loi.

Commençons par les cas les plus simples et les moins douteux.

La mère qui défend son fils au péril de sa vie, et se prive de tout pour le nourrir, fait société avec lui; c’est une bonne mère: celle au contraire qui abandonne son enfant est infidèle à l’instinct social, dont l’amour maternel est une des formes nombreuses; c’est une mère dénaturée.

Si je me jette à la nage pour retirer un homme en danger de périr, je suis son frère, son associé; si au lieu de le secourir je l’enfonce, je suis son ennemi, son assassin.

Quiconque fait l’aumône, traite l’indigent comme son associé, non, il est vrai, comme son associé en tout et pour tout, mais comme son associé pour la quantité de bien qu’il partage avec lui: quiconque ravit par la force ou par addresse ce qu’il n’a pas produit détruit en soi-même la sociabilité, c’est un brigand.

Le samaritain qui relève le voyageur étendu dans le chemin, qui panse ses blessures, le réconforte et lui donne de l’argent, se déclare son associé, son prochain; le prêtre qui passe auprès du même voyageur sans se détourner, reste à son égard inassocié, ennemi.

Dans tous ces cas, l’homme est mû par un attrait intérieur pour son semblable, par une secrète sympathie, qui le fait aimer, conjouir et condouloir: en sorte que, pour résister à cet attrait, il faut un effort de la volonté contre la nature.

Mais tout cela n’établit aucune différence entre l’homme et les animaux. Chez eux, tant que la faiblesse des petits les rend chers à leurs mères, en un mot les leur associe, on voit celles-ci les défendre au péril de leurs jours avec un courage qui rappelle nos héros mourant pour la patrie. Certaines espèces se réunissent pour la chasse, se cherchent, s’appellent, un poète dirait, s’invitent à partager une proie; dans le danger on les voit se porter secours, se défendre, s’avertir… Ajoutons cependant, pour être juste en tout, que ces démonstrations si touchantes de société, de fraternité, d’amour du prochain, n’empêchent pas les animaux de se quereller, de se battre et de se déchirer à belles dents pour leur nourriture et leurs galanteries; la ressemblance entre eux et nous est parfaite.

L’instinct social, dans l’homme et dans la bête, existe du plus au moins: sa nature est la même. L’homme est plus nécessairement, plus constamment associé; l’animal paraît plus robuste contre la solitude. Dans l’homme, les besoins de société sont plus impérieux, plus complexes; dans la bête, ils semblent moins profonds, moins variés, moins regrettés. La société, en un mot, a pour but, chez l’homme, la conservation de l’espèce et de l’individu; chez les animaux, beaucoup plus la conservation de l’espèce.

…

Il y a pourtant une différence entre nous autres bimanobipèdes et le reste des vivants; quelle est-elle?

…

[C]‘est par la réflexion et le raisonnement dont nous paraissons exclusivement doués que nous savons qu’il est nuisible, d’abord aux autres, ensuite à nous-mêmes, de résister à l’instinct de société qui nous gouverne, et que nous appelons justice; c’est la raison qui nous apprend que l’homme égoïste, voleur, assassin, traître à la société, en un mot, pèche contre la nature, et se rend coupable envers les autres et envers lui-même losqu’il fait le mal avec connaissance; c’est enfin le sentiment de notre instinct social d’une part et de notre raison de l’autre qui nous fait juger que l’être semblable à nous doit porter la responsabilité de ses actes.

***

Rights are the set of principles regulating society; justice, in man, means to respect and follow those principles. To pursue justice is to obey social instinct; to perform an act of justice is to perform an act of society. If then we observe men’s conduct towards each other in a number of different circumstances, it will be easy for us to recognize when they are in society and when they are not; the result will give us, by induction, the law.

Let us start by the simplest and least dubious cases.

The mother who defends her son with her life, and deprives herself of all to feed him, is in society with him; she is a good mother: the one who abandons her child is unfaithful to social instinct, of which material love is one of numerous forms; she is being unnatural.

If I dive in to save a man in fatal danger, I am his brother, his associate; if instead of saving him I drown him, I am his enemy, his assassin.

Whosoever gives alms, treats the pauper as his associate, not, it is true, as his associate in everything, but as his associate for the quantity of goods he shares with him: whosoever steals by force or skill what he did not produce destroys sociability in himself, he is a brigand.

The good samaritan who helps up the traveler laying on the road, who dresses his wounds, comforts him and gives him money, declares himself his associate, his kin; the priest who passes by the same traveler without even looking back, stays towards him non-associated, enemy.

In all cases, man is moved by an innate appeal for his fellows, by a secret sympathy, which makes him love, and suffer and enjoy when others suffer and enjoy: so that resisting this appeal requires an effort of the will against human nature.

But none of this establishes any difference between man and the animals. In them, as long as the weakness of their young makes them dear to their mothers, in a word joins them, we see the latter risk their lives to defend them with a fearlessness that reminds us of our heroes dying for the motherland. Certain species form groups for the hunt, look for each other, call each other, a poet would say, invite each other to share prey; in danger we see them help each other, defend each other, warn each other… Let us add, to be fair, that these touching demonstrations of society, of fraternity, of brotherly love, don’t stop animals from quarreling, fighting each other and rip each other to pieces for their food and mating; the resemblance between them and us is therefore perfect.

The social instinct, in man and in the beast, exists from the most to the least: its nature is the same. Man is more necessarily, more constantly associated; other animals seem more able to withstand solitude. In man, social needs are more imperious, more complex; in the beast, they seem less profound, less varied, less missed. Society, in one word, has as goal, for man, the conservation of the species and the individual; for the animals, the conservation of the species is much more important.

…

But there is a difference between us bipedes and the rest of the living; what is it?

…

It is by the thought and reasoning of which we appear to be exclusively endowed that we know how harmful it is, first to others, then to ourselves, to resist the social instinct that governs us, and that we call justice; it is reason that teaches us that the egoist, the thief, the assassin, traitor to society, in a word, sins against nature, and makes himself guilty in the eyes of others and himself when he consciously commits evil; it is finally the feeling of our social instinct on the one hand and our reason in the other that makes us judge that beings like us must bear the responsibility of their actions.

Christians are bloodthirsthy.

Given the immorality of Christian doctrine, I’m not sure how this is a surprise or even information, but nevertheless: Christians More Likely to Support Torture.

Percentages aside, why are Christians always a healthy margin ahead of the rest of the country when it comes to waging war or brutally interrogating prisoners?

Two half-baked but possible explanations:

- Christianity has just as much emphasis – if not more – on justice as mercy, and its personal commands to be merficul do not necessarily apply to states and governments. Thus, churchgoers tend to have more binary understandings of good and evil, and are less squeamish about what they perceive to be justice.

- A high percentage of evangelicals live in the South and other rural regions where popular sentiment is more antagonistic toward nations and ethnicities believed to be “anti-American.” War and torture is much more compatible with their general support for strong national defense.

Here are the results for religion.

Proudhon on… profit.

In my previous Proudhon quote, I gave one argument as to why property is incoherent. Here is now part of the ninth argument, property is incoherent because it is powerless against property, pages 188 and 189. Not only is his conclusion interesting, but so is his description of capitalist product as being a pyramid scheme.

***

Formons une chaîne de dix, quinze, vingt producteurs, aussi longue qu’on voudra: si le producteur A prélève un bénéfice sur le producteur B, d’après les principes économiques, B doit se faire rembourser par C, C par D, et ainsi de suite jusqu’à Z.

Mais par qui Z se fera-t-il rembourser du bénéfice prélevé au commencement par A? Par le consommateur, répond Say. Misérable Escobar! Ce consommateur est-il donc autre que A, B, C, D, etc., ou Z. Par qui Z se fera-t-il rembourser? S’il se fait rembourser par le premier bénéficiaire A, il n’y a plus de bénéfice pour personne, ni par conséquent de propriété. Si, au contraire, Z supporte ce bénéfice, dès ce moment il cesse de faire partie de la société, puisqu’elle lui refuse le droit de propriété et de bénéfice qu’elle accorde aux autres associés.

Puis donc qu’une nation, comme l’humanité toute entière, est une grande société industrielle qui ne peut agir hors d’elle-même, il est démontré que nul homme ne peut s’enrichir sans qu’un autre s’appauvrisse. Car, pour que le droit de propriété, le droit d’aubaine, soit respecté dans A, il faut qu’il soit refusé à Z; par où l’on voit comme l’égalité des droits, séparée de l’égalité des conditions, peut être une vérité. L’iniquité de l’économie politique à cet égard est flagrante. “Lorsque moi, entrepreneur d’industrie, j’achète le service d’un ouvrier, je ne compte pas son salaire dans le produit net de mon entreprise, au contraire, je l’en déduis; mais l’ouvrier le compte dans son produit net…” (SAY, Économie Politique.)

Cela signifie que tout ce que gagne l’ouvrier est produit net; mais que, dans ce que gagne l’entrepreneur, cela seul est produit net, qui dépasse ses appointments. Mais pourquoi l’entrepreneur a-t-il seul le droit de bénéficier? Pourquoi ce droit, qui est au fond le droit même de propriété, est-il refusé à l’ouvrier? Aux termes de la science économique, l’ouvrier est un capital; or tout capital, outre ses frais de réparation et d’entretien, doit porter un intérêt; c’est ce que le propriétaire a soin de faire pour ses capitaux et pour lui-même; pourquoi n’est-il pas permis à l’ouvrier de prélever semblablement un intérêt sur son capital qui est lui?

La propriété est donc l’inégalité des droits; car, si elle n’était pas l’inégalité des droits, elle serait l’égalité des biens, elle ne serait pas. Or la charte constitutionnelle garantit à tous l’égalité des droits, donc, avec la charte constitutionnelle, la propriété est impossible.

***

Let’s form a chain of ten, fifteen, twenty producers, as long as we want: if producer A takes a profit from producer B, in accordance with economic principles, B must be repaid by C, C by D, and so on down to Z.

But by whom will Z be repaid of the benefit taken first by A? By the consumer, answers [Jean-Baptiste] Say. Miserable Escobar! Is this consumer therefore other than A, B, C, D, etc., or Z. By whom will Z be repaid? If he is repaid by the first beneficiary A, there is no more profit for anyone, nor, consequently, of property. If, on the other hand, Z bears the weight of this benefit, from that point on he ceases to be part of society, since she refuses him the right of property and profit she gives to his other associates.

Since a nation, like humanity as a whole, is one great industrial society which cannot act outside of itself, it is thereby demonstrated that no man can enrich himself without impoverishing another. For the right of property, the right of usury, to be respected in A, it must be refused to Z; from this we see how equality of rights, separated from equality of conditions, can be veridical. The iniquity of political economy in this respect is obvious. “When I, industrial entrepreneur, buy a worker’s services, I don’t include his wages in the net product of my business, but rather I substract it; but the worker includes it in his net product…” (SAY, Économie Politique.)

This means that all the worker makes is net product; but that, in what the entrepreneur makes, that only is net product which goes beyond his wage. But why does the entrepreneur have the sole right to profit? Why is this right, which is fundamentally the right of property, forbidden to the worker? In economic terms, the worker is capital; but all capital, besides maintenance and repair costs, must carry interest; this is what the owner does for his own capital and for himself; why is it not permitted for the worker to similarly take an interest on the capital which is himself?

Property is therefore inequality of rights; for, if it was no inequality of rights, it would be equality of goods, it would not exist. But the constitution [of the French Revolution] guarantees to all equality of rights, therefore, given the constitution, property is incoherent.

Why more Atheists than Anarchists?

Three questions left as an exercise for the reader…

As a sort of follow-up to the Proudhon materials I’m posting, I’ve got three questions for you, that you may find rather interesting (depending on how much you already know on the topic). Either way, please post your answers in the comments, no matter what your political position.

Of course, I have my own opinion on all three, but I will only give it out on the entry where I discuss your answers (if there are enough of them).

Before I ask the questions, I need to first clarify a couple of things, for those who don’t already know them. If you understand them, then feel free to skim to the questions.

The right of property is traditionally divided in three parts:
the right of usus- to use (mix your labour with)
the right of fructus- to take the fruit of that use (such as the actual fruits produced by a tree that one has used)
the right of abusus- to abuse, meaning: to destroy or damage, to sell, to rent, etc.

Usus and fructus together constitute possession, and all three together constitute property. Usus and fructus are necessary conditions for both property and possession.

For the rest of this entry, let’s take as our example a box of macaroni and cheese on the shelf of a chain grocery store (just to be clear here, I am indeed talking about a corporation) in our current capitalist system.

As it sits on the shelf, no one has a recognized right of usus or fructus on that box. We know this because, if anyone grabbed the box, carried it straight home, and tried to use it, he has already committed the crime of shoplifting (whether shoplifting is actually a crime or not is irrelevant here: we’re talking about what is currently recognized). As far as I know, there are no exceptions to this law, and therefore we can safely say that no one has any right to use or benefit from this box.

Since there is no right of usus or fructus over this box, this brings us to the first question:

Q1: Since the box of macaroni and cheese is not property, nor is it possession, what category of owned object is it?

When I buy this box of macaroni and cheese, however, I can go home, cook it, and eat the results. I have usus and fructus over it: in fact, that’s the whole purpose of buying products at a grocery store! And yet, before I bought it, no one had either of these rights. So how did these rights come to exist?

Q2: Since no one can sell what he does not have, how could I be sold the rights of usus and fructus over the box of macaroni and cheese, when no such rights existed? If they were created, how?
(please note that I am looking for a theoretical justification here, not merely a practical one: saying “the rights were created when I bought it” is not enough)

There is no right of usus or fructus over the box, but there is a presumed right of abusus, or at least there is a presumed right of sale. I know this is true because there are tags with prices below the product, and I can buy the product.

But from whom am I buying the product? Who has this right of sale? Not the cashier. If I come up to her in the store while she isn’t working and ask if I can buy a given box of macaroni and cheese from her, she will rightly say that she cannot do such a thing, since it’s not hers. When I come up to the checkstand and purchase the box, she does not put my money in her pocket; she puts it in a till, over which she only has usus, and the money is never hers.

I must therefore come to the conclusion that she is actually acting as a proxy for someone or a group of people who do have this right of sale.

Q3: Who has the right of sale over the box of macaroni and cheese?

(the answer to this question also provides us with the answer to: if shoplifting is actually a form of theft, then who are we stealing from?, since the right to sale is the only right we can steal from anyone when we steal the box of macaroni and cheese)

Keep in mind that for all these questions we’re talking about the box of macaroni and cheese yet unsold, still on the shelf- not after it was bought or before it was shipped to the store.