Category Archives: Morality

Equating intuitionism with “naive intuitionism.”

When you tell people that you’re a moral intuitionist, there is a sort of natural argument that forms in people’s minds, at least people who care about morality at all. This argument consists of equating intuitionism with what I call “naive intuitionism.” I use this term in the same way that people use “naive realism,” a term which refers to the belief that we perceive things exactly as they are. But in reality, perception is mediated by senses and a brain, which filter and interpret sensations. I refer to native intuitionism, therefore, as the belief that the propositions we develop from our moral intuitions are always a direct perception of correct moral principles.

So first, let me point out the fundamental flaw with this argument: being an intuitionist does not mean you must be a naive intuitionist, any more than being a realist means you must be a naive realist. If intuitions are the result of an evolutionary process, which I contend, then we must start from the premise that our moral faculties, like all other biological faculties, are messy. Evolution is a sloppy process of trial and error extended over ages. Because of this generous time frame, it is extremely good at eventually zeroing in on some solution to a specific problem, but it can’t start over. For instance, it can’t look for a more optimal solution if that requires it to backtrack in any way.

It is incontestable that humans are social animals adapted to life in hierarchical communities. Our moral sense is likewise that of a social animal. Not that of a solitary predator, whose calculations are almost solely instrumental (although some stupid humans pretend to imitate such a way of life), but that of a being concerned with the cooperation of others in fulfilling goals. It seems that, from the very first, human communities have fostered cooperation and division of labor. It is little wonder that predatory “moralities” are usually accompanied by a denial of evolution.

Humans interested in understanding how morality works divide intuitions in categories, like fairness, tribalism, and so on. But in our daily lives, these all co-exist and are constantly intertwined in our moral evaluations. They are not meant to be analyzed as separate units, but as facets of a moral system. When taken to extremes, they can lead to extremes of evil:

Fairness can lead to the death penalty, capitalism, and “an eye for an eye.”
Liberty can lead to vulgar individualism, and turning a blind eye to the exploitation or oppression of others.
Loyalty, and respect of authority, can lead to war and genocide.
Sanctity can lead to hatred against innocents for being “impure.”

Note that I said “when taken to extremes.” In their normal context, these intuitions should not lead one to evil. But clearly they can.

Before I continue in this line of reasoning, I want to address one objection that I foresee: some might say that the consequences I listed are the result of false premises. But this doesn’t really tell us anything, since all errors are either the result of false premises or invalid logic. The reality of the situation is that people do make grave mistakes and are often in error, and pointing that fact out does not really illustrate anything. If we could simply never make any mistakes, we wouldn’t need epistemology or morality to begin with, and this whole discussion would never need to happen (Anthropic Argument from Moral Disagreements?).

So the question becomes, how can our moral system, as I call it, get out of whack? Well, I think the answer should be obvious to anyone who understands social constructionism and hierarchical institutions. Institutions have the leverage they need to convince people that their interests are linked to the institution’s flourishing. The individual becomes identified with the nation, the religion, the economic class, the distinctive mores and traditions, the social roles, and so on, and various intuitions are associated with those same things (religion as source of sanctity and purity, government as a fair arbiter and source of liberty, etc). And when that identification is in place, it becomes relatively easy to invoke whatever intuition is needed to get people to do evil things. This is the most commonplace way to corrupt an individual.

It is rather similar to the ways in which quacks exploit our cognitive biases to make us believe in fake remedies or pseudo-science. Cognitive biases are evolved mechanisms by which we can make judgments rapidly and with finite mental resources, but they are insufficient to arrive at conclusions in complex, abstract domains, where most quackeries lie. Most people have no direct experience with medical trials, oncology, physics, or evolutionary theory. Therefore, they must rely on what they know, which is often insufficient to distinguish true claims from false claims, especially when they have been convinced that some quack theory represents some ultimate or transcendent truth. In both cases, we’re talking about natural systems that evolved under simpler social conditions being twisted by more complex structures and systems of thought.

Another good analogy is cults, because cults are just an extreme form of hierarchical institutions. People join cults with good intentions. Once they are convinced that the cult is the only way to save the world, or bring humans to a higher plane of existence, or whatever, they can be persuaded to do anything to further the aims of the cult. Their best interest, and the cult’s best interest, become one and the same.

The solution to the co-optation of our moral system is individualism, the position that one’s values and principles are more important than external obligations (like laws and religious diktats). This is rarely presented as a solution. On the other hand, vulgar individualism, the position that all morality should be purely instrumental (i.e. self-interested) and that the individual should only be concerned with their own well-being and status, is often presented as a solution, especially in this age of capitalism and neo-liberalism. But it’s just another tactic to introvert people and prevent them from looking at social realities. The more obsessed you are about yourself, the less time or energy you have to look at what other people are going through, or look at the reality of your own situation.

Is there such a thing as “evil people”?

Morality is concerned with evaluating values and actions. Ethics is concerned with evaluating rules and institutions. Neither of these fields could exist without the basis of the individual as a moral and social agent, but they are not concerned with evaluating individuals. An individual cannot have a moral or ethical status because individuals are organisms, facts of biology, therefore beyond evaluation (even when we talk about natalism or antinatalism, it is the existence of individuals, not individuals themselves, which is evaluated). Properly speaking, there is no such thing as a “good person” or an “evil person.”

This does not stop people from making such evaluations routinely. And it is so ingrained in the way we talk that it’s easy to make statements of that nature. However, it’s important to remember that such statements are generalizations or metaphors, not literal truth. If we say “the nazis were bad people,” we’re basically saying that they did bad things routinely and that therefore they could not be trusted to do good. It does not entail that there was literally badness inside of them, like some kind of gremlin or metaphysical substance, because that would be silly. No such substance exists.

However, anti-causalism (i.e. the belief in a soul, free will, or some other anti-causal form of volition) and adaptationism (the belief that evolutionary causes are sufficient to explain human behavior) both present a challenge to that position. Anti-causalists believe that people do good or evil things as a consequence of the kind of volition that they have. Adaptationists believe that people do good or evil things as a consequence of their biology. In both cases, the evaluation of actions implies an evaluation of the individual actor: doing evil means that you are evil, because you have some quality of evilness either in your soul/volition or in your brain.

First, let me get the issue of validity out of the way: I don’t believe that either of these positions are valid, as I’ve explained before. The concepts of soul, free will, and specialized brain modules, are all without merit. Not only are they invalid, but neither anti-causalism nor adaptationism are able to give a coherent account of how human behavior arises. If they fail at explaining human behavior, then we cannot use them to evaluate anything related to human behavior, including individuals.

I’ve already discussed these points. What I do want to discuss here is that the view that people are “good people” or “evil people.” For one thing, this is a reactionary view. Radicalism by definition seeks the roots of social problems in institutions and the basic principles they implement in our societies. It is this identification of institutions as roots of social problems which leads to the desire to change society. But institutions are only relevant because they influence human behavior. If people are innately good or evil, and are not influenced at all by institutions, then radicalism cannot be true.

Neither can egalitarianism be true. If some people are innately good and some are innately evil, then egalitarianism is a hollow farce. It is no wonder, then, that advocates of anti-causalism and adaptationism think egalitarianism is a hollow farce. The only alternative is conservatism, which is basically the view that some people are inherently better than others and deserve power within a set of “traditional” structures. One may disagree in what criteria should be used to judge people as inherently better (Libertarians, for example, believe that the economic arena is the only proper space to judge people, as opposed to most other conservatives), but any such disputes would still take place within the conservative framework.

Furthermore, the view that people are innately good or evil is at odds with the desire to change society, which is based around a view of human nature that is both knowable and changeable. Under anti-causalism, human nature is not knowable, since it exists in some unnatural, mystical realm. Under adaptationism, human nature is not changeable, and changes in the way society operates should be futile in the long run (e.g. from monarchy to democracy). Nothing but the one correct way to organize society around our biology should be “successful” at all. Yet clearly this is not the case, since a wide variety of cultures are “successful.”

I have commented many years ago on the fact that the belief that people are innately evil is reactionary. The belief in people being innately good or evil is merely an extension of that view. But in their case, “good people” usually means “people who are like me” or “people who agree with me.”

Still, there are plenty of people who use these terms without necessarily wanting to be reactionary. For example, one can believe that the Nazis were evil, or that cops are evil, and believe that this is not a reactionary belief. I would agree with such statements, but they are not literally true. No Nazi was an “evil person” and no cop is an “evil person.” The reality is that they are morally depraved and untrustworthy. But they are not “evil people” who have “chosen to be evil” or who have a “corrupt soul.” This reflects a superstitious attitude towards the world, that is to say, attributing material form to a concept (a process which philosophers call reification).

By and large, when we are talking about social behavior (what is usually referred to when we talk of “good people” and “evil people”), people are motivated by incentives, because incentives provide people with the physical and psychological benefits of living in a given society. People will ignore incentives if they have an even more powerful reason to do something, but usually this is not the case. These incentives are created and sustained by institutions, and aim to perpetuate an institution’s actual purpose. Since institutions can be at odds, incentive systems may also conflict, in which case other factors will influence behavior as well.

It is difficult to speak about incentives in general terms, so let’s talk about specific examples. Even though we live in a supposedly liberated era, most people still get married and have children. From the contra-causal standpoint, people simply do so, with no causal reason at all. But with all the lifestyle possibilities that exist, how would most people just randomly do the same thing? So the contra-causal explanation makes about as much sense as flipping 100 dice, getting 80 of them rolling a 6, and then doing this again and again. Surely the possibility that the dice are weighted makes more sense than the absence of any cause.

The adaptationist explanation also doesn’t work, because we know of societies without monogamous marriage, or without marriage as we understand it (including Western societies, where pair bonding is generally temporary). If the adaptationists were right and we are biologically made for lifetime pair bonding and child-raising, such societies could not exist at all, or at least they could not last very long. There could also never be such a thing as childfreedom or antinatalism, any more than there exists people who preach freedom from food (breatharians notwithstanding) or freedom from social norms (although many statists like to pretend that Anarchists are like this).

So why do people get married and have children? States have a keen interest in keeping population numbers up in order to receive more taxation revenue, unless they are indisputably overpopulated. Therefore States offer numerous privileges to married people and lucrative economic rewards to parents. Proselyting religions, which also depend on numbers, strongly encourage their believers to breed, and have in the past used strong-arm tactics (and some still continue to do this, like the Catholic Church) to ensure breeding within marriage. Generally, people who are married and with children are seen as having a higher social status, and are given more attention than those who do not (e.g. in the workplace or in health care).

These are all very powerful incentives, but they are magnified many times over by the fact that children are raised by their parents to want these things. Parents do this because marriage and having children are considered to be part and parcel of the life blueprint. Parents raise their children to be “normal” and “successful” (the alignment paradigm).

The Nazis are the usual example people trot out to explain “evil people,” so let’s look at that. At its peak, the Nazi Party’s membership included 10% of the German population. Why were people members? Well, many jobs required party membership, which in itself is a powerful incentive. Also, the Nazi Party fueled German people’s hopes through strength and fear of the Other, like all right-wing regimes do in times of economic and political crisis. The general point here is that people didn’t join the Nazi Party because they were evil. They, by and large, did so because they thought it was the right thing to do, for themselves or their country.

And this is a point that’s really important to understand when it comes to “evil people.” The adaptationists are correct insofar as there are some people who are sociopaths, and who have no intention of doing good. But this is a tiny minority of the population. Generally, people who do evil do so out of a misdirected desire to do good. Studying cults for a long time has shown me that people who end up doing tremendously evil things don’t do so because they are mendacious. They usually join cults out of a desire to do good, to find some higher truth, to help themselves grow, to help others. They end up doing evil because they are brainwashed into believing that their actions are for the greater good. Like cults, institutions mislead us constantly on the nature of good and evil, although in a much less coercive manner, especially if they can count on parents or the media to do the dirty work for them.

Now, I know some people will read this and think that I am trying to excuse “evil people,” to rationalize their evilness. This is what people always say when you look at the causes of evil behavior. They fail to grasp that understanding something and rationalizing it are two very different things. The goal here is not to divest people of their responsibilities, quite the opposite. The anti-causalist cannot explain responsibility, because whatever is making “choices” (whether a soul or some supernatural agency) is not “me” in any meaningful way. Adaptationists, on the other hand, can justify responsibility, but only some of it: they can justify a person being responsible for their own actions, but they cannot justify collective responsibility, so they only have one small piece of the picture.

On the constructionist account, the individual is responsible for their actions because the individual is the last link in the causal chain that led to the action. To make an analogy, we may say that “Paul made the pie” insofar as Paul put the pie together and cooked it. But his actions were only the last link in the causal chain that led to the existence of the pie, a causal chain which extends towards the beginning of time (as Carl Sagan famously said, if you want to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first create a universe). The beginning of time, however, is of little interest to us. The point here is that both positions vastly underestimate the scope of responsibility by excluding the collective responsibility contained within any action. As it turns out, and contrary to common belief, it’s the adaptationists who reject large swaths of responsibility. As reactionaries, it is their job to reject collective responsibility as a concept.

To address another common objection, to acknowledge collective responsibility does not mean supporting cultural relativism. Actually, it’s exactly the opposite. Cultural relativism holds that all cultural practices are equally valid. But the only way this could possibly be true is if we divorce evil actions from the incentive systems of culture. To a constructionist, this makes no sense: evil actions are perpetrated because of the incentive systems present in our society, which includes culture. Because it rejects the causality between incentives and actions, cultural relativism is closest to the anti-causal position, and it is people who preach about choice, free will and agency who are most likely to be cultural relativists. Radicals are by and large not cultural relativists.

Besides, “culture” is not some kind of entity that rises ex nihilo from a community or a society. Culture evolves from, and is inextricably linked to, the material, psychological, political, and spiritual condition of its people. A lot of this is itself the result of incentive systems. It’s always important to remember that when we talk about systems this complex, we are talking about feedback loops. Not simple “this caused that which caused the other thing,” but systems constantly re-creating and molding each other. Institutions, cultures, ideologies, human actions, all cause each other to some extent, change each other to some extent, and evolve in parallel.

Statism is a rationalization of power.

The basic definition of the State is that it is a monopoly of power over a territory, through legitimized (or as statists would say, actually legitimate) force. Anarchists add to this basic definition the fact that it is, like all institutions which deal in power (of whatever kind), hierarchical.

And yes, I do include “anarcho-capitalists,” voluntaryists, and other right-wing extremists in the category of statists. They still believe in a State, but their justification is absolute property rights instead of democratic elitism (as I’ve previously noted). The common pretense of these right-wing types to being anti-government, anti-statists, or even anarchists, is just that, a pretense. Sadly, thanks to the confusion that these types are hell-bent on sowing, it is necessary to reiterate this.

It is possible to define statism from a different angle, not as a belief in an institution but as a particular sort of prejudice. The prejudice can be expressed as such:
“People are self-interested, corrupt, and/or downright evil: you can’t count on people to do the right thing. That’s why we need a State composed of people whose job it is to redirect some of people’s energies towards the common welfare and common goals.”

This is a very persuasive argument, but its force lies not in its logic, but with how well it meshes with our current forms of democratic elitism. After all, the elites are ostensibly democratic (in practice, this is mostly not true), and not tyrannical, because their aim is not to exploit people but to help them. And democracy, which gets the credit for things like the welfare state and workplace laws (which were passed against the will of a large proportion of the democratic elite, not because of the democratic elite), can therefore pretend to exist for the common welfare.

The argument is illogical for many reasons. First of all, there is an origin problem (which I’ve discussed before, for example): if people are so self-interested or corrupt that they can’t do the right thing, then how did an organization (the State) arise that embodied the virtues of long-term planning and common goals? Where did these come from? Second, we do not know of any hierarchy where concentration of power causes more compassion to flow from the superiors to the inferiors. Concentration of power tends to have the opposite effect: the more power we have on others, the more we use that power for our own interests.

Compounding the illogic is the belief that the State is a “servant of the people” and is “accountable through democracy.” How can an institution which supposedly serves the common welfare against individuals who only seek their own self-interest be accountable to those same individuals? So this statist view is profoundly contradictory and ultimately must be incoherent, if it is to be logical at all.

I was talking to someone about the “magic hierarchies” concept. As it turns out, she worked in a hospital. I just kept asking her, which function of a hospital necessitates subverting people’s values? She could not answer this, but kept repeating that people just couldn’t run a hospital. But people do run hospitals. The fact that they do so as part of corporate or State hierarchies doesn’t change the fact that actual people are doing everything that is done in a hospital. The fact that some people control the rest is not necessary for any action that takes place in a hospital. Why would you need to subvert people’s values to run a hospital? People already want and need good hospitals.

So this woman was, in a sense, prejudiced, although it’s not a prejudice that we recognize or label. And I think this prejudice is unrecognized precisely because it lies at the core of statism, and is therefore so common that we don’t even look at it. In its more extreme form, it’s the “people are innately sinners/evil/corrupt” belief. In its general form, it consists of believing that “people” are incapable of self-management (for whatever reason), but that politicians and CEOs are somehow superior to them because they are capable of using their power to manage others fairly and efficiently, something that “people” could never do.

Somehow politicians are superior to “people.” But under democracy, we, the unenlightened ones, vote them into power. So apparently “we the people” are too stupid to manage ourselves but we’re smart enough to figure out which politicians are enlightened enough to do so. That makes about as much sense as saying that I don’t know anything about quantum physics but I can vote on which physicists have the “correct” interpretation of quantum physics.

The prejudice is also false. There have been plenty of societies and organizations based on self-governance. Historical evidence does not support the claim that self-governance does not work. The current self-managed businesses (like the recuperated factories in Argentina, or Mondragon corporation) are not failing. The evidence shows that self-management is at least as good as hierarchical management, and it does not involve subjecting anyone’s values.

The confusion between moral statements and political statements.

People make all sorts of statements about things being right or wrong, and we tend to act as if all those statements are roughly equal. Statements based on the Bible, for example, are put on the same playing field as statements based on science.

My point here, however, is to talk about right or wrong from a moral standpoint. When controversial issues like pornography, prostitution, white supremacism, affirmative action, or corporal punishment against children, are brought up, we discuss moral statements and political statements as if they answered each other. But actually those two types of statements cannot respond to each other, since they pertain to completely different things.

A moral statement is a statement which makes an evaluation of right or wrong based on values, or principles derived from values. For example, a statement such as “it is wrong to kill animals in order to feed on their flesh” is a moral statement which may be evaluated based on the values underlying it (concerns for animal welfare, being against suffering, being against murder for self-interested purposes, and so on). Whether you agree or disagree, I think it’s clear that this is a moral statement.

A political statement, as I define it, is a statement which makes an evaluation of right or wrong based on power. I’ve previously defined power, using J.K. Galbraith’s classification, as being of three general types: condign power (force), compensatory power (money) and conditioned power (indoctrination). Any statement which relies on one of these three things is a political statement, not a moral statement.

So if you say something like “it is not wrong to kill animals for meat them because most people are willing to pay for the meat,” that’s a political statement, not a moral statement. Your justification is based on money as the standard, that it is not wrong because people are willing to spend money on it. People spending money on things does not provide any sort of evidence of its morality: one can pay for anything, including hitmen, rape, massive fraud, and States routinely pay for war, torture and political assassinations. All it proves is that enough people feel that they benefit from the action to want to pay for it, and that these people do not particularly care what the victims think.

Here I want to clarify a possible objection. Someone might say that my first example also involves power, in the form of coercion against the animals, and that therefore it is not a moral statement. But it is not sufficient for a statement to include a form of power, or a value, to be of a certain type: we must look at how it’s justified. In the first statement, the coercion is not the justification, but the exact opposite, as it is what is being argued against. In the second statement, money (in the form of consumer demand) is the justification.

It is relatively trivial, though, to retool the second statement to a form like this: “it is not wrong to kill animals for meat them because most people value meat consumption.” That would be a moral statement. Not a particularly good one, since it is heavily influenced by conditioning.

This brings me to my next point, which is that the moral/political dichotomy is not black and white. In Western societies, a lot of moral statements have indoctrination hiding behind them. As a general principle, we should be far more wary of classifying any commonplace statement as moral statement, because statements generally become commonplace because of indoctrination or being promulgated by major social institutions. If someone tells people what they already want to hear, or are used to hearing, then they are likely doing so to curry favor, not to make a rigorous argument.

To take an extreme example, someone proposing antinatalism is not likely to do so to gain people’s favor, but rather generally (but not always) do so out of extensive arguing and weighing the arguments. Someone proposing natalism, on the other hand, is likely to do so to gain support, since it is a position that most people (that is to say, parents) already accept enthusiastically. The same thing is true to a lesser extent of other unpopular ideologies, like atheism, feminism, moral intuitionism, and so on.

Note that I am not saying that all commonplace statements are always wrong. Being classified as a political statement instead of a moral statement does not make a statement necessarily wrong. The fact that not all power can be eliminated from society, even under the most utopian scheme possible, is the most rigorous proof of this. Likewise, there are plenty of moral statements that are just plain wrong.

Let me use these principles on a debate that I’ve written a great deal about, pornography. So you often get an argument of the form “pornography is fine because women get paid well to participate.” This is a political statement, not a moral statement, and therefore has no place in a moral debate. The fact that the producers of pornographic videos have the money to get women to perform sexual acts has no bearing on the morality of said sexual acts, or of their distribution. Rather, it is a statement about a desired distribution of power: that rich producers should have more power, and women needing money should have less power. It is, basically, capitalist logic (whoever has the money makes the rules). Arguing about distribution of power can be a worthwhile subject, but it’s not a topic of morality.

So let’s take an argument from the other side (that is to say, my side), such as “prostitution is wrong because money does not equal consent.” While this argument involves the concept of money, it is a moral statement because it is justified by the moral concept of consent. We can reformulate the statement like this: “Consent is necessary for something to be right, trading money is not a form of consent, therefore prostitution is wrong.” Whether you agree with it or not (I do realize it is not a rigorous logical argument), I think it’s clear that it is a statement about morality.

Inherent in any moral statement is a pro-rationality, anti-power preface that can generally be described as: “No matter what the law says, any holy book says, or any other external authority says, I believe that…” While external factors are part of any moral evaluation, moral obligation cannot logically be derived from some externally-imposed obligation, such as the law or divine commands. Any statement that cannot thus be prefaced cannot be a moral statement. For instance, you could not say “No matter what the law says, prostitution is wrong because it’s against the law.” “Prostitution is wrong because it’s against the law” is necessarily a political statement (which I disagree with, since the law has nothing to do with morality).

A lot of people do not acknowledge the existence of any form of power beyond force. This means that they will put statements that are justified by money or indoctrination in the category of moral statements. This leads to the absurdity of equating payment with consent, or to say that a child who was indoctrinated in a religion for 18 years now has “freedom of religion” because they’ve become adults. I feel that a lot of moral disagreements stem from things which are actually not about morality at all, and that if we were able to distinguish the two, discussions would be a lot more productive.

Morality is about conformity versus disobedience.

You are probably familiar with the Milgram Experiment. To give a short explanation, during the sixties, this guy called Milgram made an experiment by which people were taken off the street and were told by a person in a lab coat that they were part of the testing of another person who could be heard but was not visible (and who was actually a confederate). Every time that person gave a wrong answer, they were to be given electric shocks of increasing intensity which elicited screams of pain from the person tested and, eventually, would lead to death. The experiment was made in order to determine whether ordinary people would follow orders to kill others, and under what circumstances (partially motivated by the horrors of World War 2 and the Holocaust).

What was not studied, however, is the personality of the people who disobeyed and those who obeyed. A recent experiment was made to try to figure this out. And the results were rather interesting: agreeable, social people were more likely to obey orders to kill the subject, while anti-social, disagreeable people were more likely to disobey.

Do I like these results? Of course I do. As a lifelong anti-social, disagreeable person, I like to be told I’m more likely to be moral than other people, especially people (social, agreeable people) who tend to think I’m terrible. And people who are more social or agreeable may be reluctant in accepting the results, or may feel like they’re being attacked.

But I think there’s something deeper to talk about here beyond people’s personalities (which I think are fairly set in stone anyway). The dominant opinion about morality is that a person can only be moral if they follow the laws and mores of their society at that point in time. This position seems to be particularly prevalent in the United States, perhaps because of the higher level of fundamentalist religion. Christianity is, after all, very legalistic (and so are Judaism and Islam): its main concern is establishing rules of conduct for the individual, using God as the justification for the enforcement of those laws on everyone, believers and unbelievers alike. Christianity is not about showing us a new human potential or an ideal, but about repressing what is human in us (Christians say Jesus is the ideal, but it’s an ideal that is by definition unattainable).

There are logical problems with following our society’s laws and mores, and not the least of those is the whole relativism of the thing. Laws and mores change from century to century, and from place to place. It seems therefore entirely arbitrary to follow the laws and mores of our society at this precise time: why are those laws and those mores more desirable?

Anyhow, my greater point is that there are two basic views about morality: that humans are innately good (as many anti-authoritarians, such as myself, would propose) and that humans are innately evil (as pushed forward by most religious and authoritarian views). Now clearly I know there are more possibilities: one can believe in blank slate theory (although that has been largely discredited by science), or one can believe that humans are born with the possibilities for good and for evil.

The basic scientific information on this subject is that humans, like all primates, evolved as animals with a highly developed sociality. We also have scientific studies showing that even babies (way before they can understand or formulate moral principles) have a desire to help. Finally, we know that other primates also have moral traits which we usually attribute to humans (like fairness). Based on these, and other, lines of evidence, my conclusion is that some form of intuitionism must be true. We are born as fundamentally moral beings, with an internal moral compass.

What happens to us is that hierarchical social institutions constantly try to bend our moral compass to accommodate their values and principles. Most of us start our lives in a family institution, or some similar institution where adults control children’s lives. As a child, you learn pretty quickly that your values, your moral evaluations, are unwanted most of the time. You learn to follow what your parents think your values should be. This provides an opening for other hierarchies with even more devastating values to get into your brain, a lot of which are concerned with you hating or killing people who play for “another team,” like religion, sexism/racism, the military, and nationalism, or with exploiting one another, like sexism/racism, schools, capitalism and neo-liberalism. And the laws and mores of our society exist, in a large part, to support these institutions and their aims.

In our modern Western societies, there are two kinds of people who see themselves as non-conformists: fundamentalist Christians (who see themselves as rebelling against a sinful secular world) and radicals in some form or another (who see themselves as rebelling against the evil in our social institutions). Fundamentalist Christians, however, only “rebel” against institutions to the extent that they can conform to their own celestial dictatorship (to borrow Hitchens’ turn of phrase). As such, they are no more “non-conformists” than people who quit alcohol so they can take up smoking are “healthy.” They are non-conformists only to the average person who will not consider or even tolerate differing viewpoints.

When viewed from the perspective of conformity versus disobedience, the findings of that study are therefore not that surprising. What kind of people are most likely to go along with the mainstream view (which pursues the aims of our social institutions)? Agreeable and social people, of course. In order to be agreeable and social, you have to share a basic agreement with other people. You will get along better with other people if you are a liberal or a conservative, if you support your country, if you hate the kind of people your kind of people is supposed to hate, and like the kind of people your kind of people is supposed to like.

The anti-social attitude, at least from my personal experience, is not exactly opposed to getting along, but it is a rejection of compromise. I refuse to get along with anyone or any group if it means I have to compromise what I believe in. To many people, this makes me an asshole or a loser or a person who is otherwise aberrant, and I accept that. It’s difficult to be a social animal and to be anti-social at the same time. But the benefit is that I am more able to be myself, and to accept myself, than most people. There is comedy in the fact that people tell you to be yourself, but they never actually mean it. Anti-social people actually mean it.

It is no coincidence that radicals level their criticism against institutions, not against individuals. By and large, it is not individuals that are the problem, except insofar as they are led by institutions to believe in, and support, evil principles. People are moved by incentives. If you engineer a society so that the only way to be successful and happy is to exploit each other, and that people are indoctrinated to believe exploiting each other is the right thing to do, then people will exploit each other, not out of malice but out of the belief that they’re doing the right thing. And most people generally have no reason to reconsider their basic beliefs, because they are agreeable and agreeable people go with the flow.

Now, I am not saying that you can’t be a radical and be a social person at the same time, or an anti-social conformist, but I wouldn’t wish either of these personality types on anyone. They just seem like the worse of both worlds (although the former wouldn’t be too bad if you worked for some leftist non-profit or something).

Of course there are many rationalizations made to try to justify conformity. The one most often used is that what is ethical is not practical, for the individual or for society. But the question then arises: practical TO WHO? Surely an egalitarian society would be practical for 90% of the population, but it would definitely not be practical with the 10% composed of the power elite and those with the biggest fortunes. When they say something is “not practical,” what they mean is: it’s not practical for those in power, economic and political. It’s not practical for those who want to keep doing what we’ve been doing for the last sixty years. And their conformity is going to have us all killed. The Earth has become one gigantic Milgram Experiment. And we’re the subjects.

Answering some Kohlberg Dilemmas (Heinz and the drug).

In my last entry, I gave my answers to a Kohlberg Dilemma involving a child Joe and his father. This one is a more famous example: I vaguely remember running into it before in philosophy class.

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. the drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.

Of note is that this is a less realistic scenario than the first. A cure for any kind of cancer would not be discovered by a mere druggist. Making the scenario about a drug company would be more realistic but also more unwieldy. I think the scenario should have been about something else entirely.

That minor complaint aside, this scenario is definitely strongly connected to the capitalist system, where we believe that discoveries are an “intellectual property” which can be stolen. We also happen to believe that people have the right to life, but we don’t, in many societies, believe they have a right to health care, which makes any such right to life a logical impossibility. It is also about the profit motive being more important than the people motive. Capitalism is an inhuman system in all respects. It has no connection to real human rights or the real humanity we can show to each other.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug?
1a. Why or why not?

I have one issue with this question, and that is: if this cure involved radium, then how could Heinz or his wife know how to administer it safely? Anyway, I suppose we need to assume that the cure is easy to administrate, like some kind of pill (although ingesting radium seems rather dangerous).

That being said, my answer would be yes. Heinz should steal the drug in order to save his wife. Presumably he values his wife’s survival and health more than the chance of getting caught and going to jail. This is a moral question, not an ethical question, so there’s not really any issue of rights or principles here.

2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?
2a. Why is it right or wrong?

Now we’re entering into ethical considerations. The arguments for the theft being wrong would revolve around property rights, since a theft is by definition an attack on property rights. But I’ve already debunked property rights: nothing can be an actual right if it goes against another person’s rights. In this specific case, the druggist’s “property right” cannot trump the wife’s right to life. Beyond that, I don’t see any reason why the action could be wrong. Saving someone’s life is generally a good thing (if they want to live and if it spares them future suffering). The fact that the theft supports such an action means that it is, at the very least, not wrong.

My answer would be that stealing the drug is a right thing to do in this situation, because it is not wrong. The same evaluation applies, I think, to not stealing the drug. Neither of these actions can be wrong from an ethical standpoint, given the information we have in the scenario. Since my answer relies heavily on a factual statement (that property rights are bunk), I wouldn’t rate it on the Kohlberg scale, but it would probably be rated as post-conventional.

3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
3a. Why or why not?

I do not believe that Heinz has a duty or obligation to steal the drug. As a society, we have an obligation to support the wife’s health in any way we can, but this does not mean that Heinz has to be the one to do it. To give an analogy I’ve used before, we recognize people’s right to be free from fires, but we don’t demand that any passerby help stop fires under penalty of law. We recognize that extinguishing fires is a specialized occupation, and we ensure that firefighters are the ones equipped to do so, not just some random people on the street (in modern times, anyway: standing around and passing buckets of water is another story).

So my point would be, there’s no reason to put the obligation on Heinz to cure his wife. If anyone has a duty or obligation here, it’s the druggist, who has the obligation to provide life-saving medications so everyone who needs them can have access to them (he is, after all, a druggist). Whatever action Heinz decides to take is a matter of personal risk-evaluation and moral evaluation, and has nothing to do with duties or obligations.

My evaluation here qualifies as post-conventional, insofar as it establishes a universal standard of justice (the obligation of the druggist to provide life-saving medications as being more important than profits).

My answers to the first questions have been rather different from my answers in the previous scenario of Joe and his father. In that scenario, I said that the father had no right to demand money from his son, and that the son’s money was rightly his. In this case, however, I believe that the druggist is not within his right to demand the kind of money that he’s demanding from Heinz, and that he has no right to his “intellectual property.” This may seem like a contradiction, but there are two huge difference between the two scenarios. The first is that in the Joe scenario, the child’s possession of the money was legitimate (his forty dollars was a wage given to him for legitimate work), while in this scenario, the druggist’s demands are based on profit, that is to say, illegitimate gains (the four thousand dollars is an arbitrary figure disconnected from the actual costs of the drug’s production and distribution). The second is that the druggist justifies himself on the basis of “intellectual property,” which is a contradictory concept (for many of the same reasons that the concept of property is contradictory).

Now, it may be that four thousand dollars is a reasonable cost price for the drug because the cost of discovery was so great (although I would question how a druggist could have spent all his time discovering this drug instead of working). But that would be a case for public provision of the drug (either by the State or the much better alternative of non-hierarchical health care), not for charging excessive amount of money to people who need it and can’t afford it. The belief that high research costs justify depriving people of vital health care is asinine and extremist capitalist nonsense.

4. If Heinz doesn’t love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? Does it make a difference in what Heinz should do whether or not he loves his wife?
4a. Why or why not?

5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger?
5a. Why or why not?

6. Suppose it’s a pet animal he loves. should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?
6a. Why or why not?

I think all these questions are obviously related. They are all moral questions similar to question 1, but with a lesser value being put on the life that needs saving. Presumably everyone would have some sort of cut-off point at which they’d say “no, Heinz should not do it just to save a stranger or a pet.” However, these are moral questions, not ethical questions, therefore they are essentially unanswerable by a third party. It would all depend on how Heinz evaluates the risks of the theft, as well as how much he values the survival of his wife, the stranger, or the pet. I would have no objection to Heinz stealing the drug for any of these reasons.

7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another’s life?
7a. Why or why not?

My answer to question 3 provides some indication of my answer here. I don’t think it is particularly important for anyone to save another person’s life, because most people are not qualified or equipped to do so, and it would be unfair to ask them to do it. While it is important for everyone to contribute their fair share of resources towards helping those who are qualified and equipped to do these jobs (through taxation, for example), we can’t expect saving people’s lives to be everyone’s daily concern.

Note that I am not talking here about Good Samaritan situations. I do think that Good Samaritan laws (laws protecting bystanders who give assistance) are a good thing in general. I am also skeptical of duty to rescue laws, apart from those cases where common law already applies (e.g. in cases where the danger was created by the bystander, between a parent or caretaker and minor children, between transportation companies and their patrons, between spouses). In general, again apart from the cases where common law applies, I think the decision to rescue or not to rescue should be left to the judgment of the bystander.

I am not sure where this answer fits on the scale. It may qualify as stage 4 (conventional), because it concerns the functioning of society as a whole at a pragmatic level, and not really any higher standard of justice.

8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?
8a. Why or why not?

No, I do not think a law alone can make an action morally wrong, for the same reason I gave in the previous scenario: I reject the relevance of parental authority and legal authority to moral decisions. To me, this is not an ethical consideration but a statement of fact: I am not saying that we should not consider the law as making an action morally wrong, I am saying that the law cannot (as a matter of fact) make an action morally wrong. The fact that a law exists against a given action (e.g. theft of “intellectual property”) or that no law exists against a given action (e.g. pornography), or that the State approves of, and subsidizes, a given action (e.g. procreation), has no bearing whatsoever on its moral status.

Because my answer has no ethical component, it cannot be rated on the Kohlberg scale (but the premise that the law is morally irrelevant only fits stage 6, post-conventional).

9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?
9a. Why or why not?
9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do?

My answer here is a continuation of my answer to question 8, as well as what I said about legal considerations in the previous scenario. In general, the law is only a consideration in the prudential sense that one may fear going to court or getting assaulted by a police officer. One should not, in any case, obey the law; one should fear the law, in the same way that one may fear a hurricane but that the hurricane does not confer any moral obligations. The latter statement (that hurricanes confer moral obligations) seems silly, therefore the statement that we should “obey the law” (i.e. that the law confers moral obligations) should seem equally silly, since a hurricane and the force of law are both situations of emergency, brute facts, which cannot be reasoned with and cannot be resolved by rational thought. So my short answer is that one should not “obey the law,” only fear it.

This applies to Heinz’ actions in the sense that he must measure his prudential interest in not going to jail in his evaluation of the risk of committing the theft. Whether Heinz is risk-averse or a risk-taker, whether there are other factors lowering or raising the risk, will have a big influence on this evaluation.

Note that I am not making a case for consequentialism here. The consequences of Heinz’s actions are not relevant to any evaluation of whether they are right or wrong. If Heinz ends up going to jail, and his wife dies, his action is not thereby wrong. And if Heinz remains a free man and his wife is cured, his action is not thereby right. My evaluation is solely made on the basis that the druggist has no right to keep Heinz from acquiring the drug. Every other factor in the case, including consequences, is irrelevant to the ethical conclusion that Heinz is in the right if he decides to steal the drug.

10. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do?
10a. Why?

Again, I have to repeat something I wrote in answer to the previous scenario, as well as my answer to question 3: Heinz has no responsibility or obligation in this case because he has caused no wrong, and is not about to cause any wrong (since the theft would not be wrong). It is the druggist who has a responsibility and obligation to provide needed drugs to the population. Of the two possible outcomes, that Heinz tries to steal the drug or that Heinz does not try to steal the drug, neither can be said to be “more responsible”: he is partially responsible for his wife’s well-being, but it would be irrational to expect him to be responsible for stealing drugs from someone else (a dangerous and illegal action) in order to ensure that well-being.

If I had to give an answer, I would say that the most responsible thing for Heinz to do is to do what he thinks is best in the situation. This is not a real life situation, so real life considerations are not really relevant here, otherwise the most responsible thing for Heinz to do might be, for example, to get the media on his case and create a new Martin Shkreli-type situation, completely ruining the asshole’s life and hopefully lowering the price of the drug in the meantime.

Feel free to argue about my answers, or post your own answers, in the comments section.

Answering some Kohlberg Dilemmas (Joe and his father).

I have previously posted about the Kohlberg scale of moral development. Basically, they represent the development of morality in the individual, from obedience to evade punishment all the way to universal ethics based on principles like human rights. Kohlberg believed that we all went through the stages in that order and that, as in psychological development, we could “get stuck” on any of these stages. Basically, even if you don’t believe in these stages as being a natural development, they still provide a way of classifying and differentiating moral justifications and rationalizations.

Kohlberg, by the way, believed that women were morally inferior to men. One of his colleagues, Carol Gilligan, argued that this belief was based on an obsession about abstract ethical principles (an obsession which still exist in the political discourse today), and that the last two stages weren’t necessarily the end point of moral development. One does not have to believe that abstract ethical principles are superior to, for example, a view of ethical problems as a network of relations between individuals. So the top of the scale should be taken with a grain of salt. Abstract ethical principles are one way, but not the only way, to reason about moral issues post-conventionally.

In order to measure moral development, Kohlberg used scenarios and asked open-ended questions about them, evaluating the reasoning behind the answers. I thought these scenarios were interesting, for a couple of reasons. The one about Joe and his father opens some questions related to childism and child rights, which I think is very relevant to this blog. The famous Heinz scenario also opens some questions related to capitalism and property rights. So I want to go through these two scenarios here.

Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the forty dollars it cost to go to camp, and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe’s father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn’t want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

I like this scenario because it goes to the core of childism: children’s deeply-held values and desires against parental authority. Granted, this particular scenario is a hypothetical, but it is the sort of conflict that takes place all the time in all sorts of families for all sorts of reasons: parents shutting down their children’s values in favor of their own, whether overtly under the form of orders or outright coercion, or covertly under the form of verbal abuse or blackmail. I think this scenario in particular may have been engineered to make the child’s situation look more sympathetic, although it is not whose side you take that’s important, for the sake of the Kohlberg scale, as much as the depth of your justification as to why you take one side or the other. But as an anti-childist, I am on the side of the child in any conflict between children’s values and parental authority.

1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money?
1a. Why or why not?

I’m not sure if this question is formulated correctly. After all, we do not know any more about his relationship with his father. If the father is willing to go so far as to alienate his son just for a fishing trip, it doesn’t seem like they’re on good terms, but there could be other factors involved. Whether he should refuse to give the money or not would depend on that relationship, amongst other things. But going on the data from the scenario and nothing else, it seems clear that Joe strongly values going to the camp and does not put a great value on his father going to a fishing trip (and why should he?). So on that basis alone, one would be inclined to answer yes.

As for the place on the scale, the question cannot be answered in terms of principles or rights, because it is a personal matter, not a question of ethics. If the question was “does Joe have the right to refuse to give his father the money,” then that would be a different story (my answer, of course, would be yes).

2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
2a. Why or why not?

In a sense, this question is trivial: of course the father has the right to tell Joe to give him the money. We have the right to ask people to give us money, but they also have the right to refuse. So I assume that the question really means: does the father have the right to order Joe to give him the money and, as a logical consequence, have the right to enforce that order?

The father does not have the right to give Joe orders on the basis of him being Joe’s father. Apart from his responsibilities and duties as a father, his relation with Joe is one of one human being to another human being, and no human being has the right to simply order another to give them money. Usually this is done as a result of a prior agreed-upon exchange (e.g. of money for services or products, of money for citizenship rights, of money to support some cause or organization), but in this case, we are not told of any prior agreed-upon exchange. Therefore, the answer must be no. There is no justification present for the father to have the right to order Joe to give him the money. Joe is perfectly within his rights to decide what to do with the money, as long as it doesn’t interfere with the father’s responsibilities and duties (and going to a fishing trip has nothing to do with either).

My answer here is not at the conventional level, because I care not one bit whether the law or social standards would be on Joe’s side or on his father’s side. In general, my answers in this scenario are at the post-conventional level simply because I reject the relevance of parental authority and legal authority to moral decisions. Only the fact that parental coercion and legal coercion exist make them important: this importance is not a moral one but a prudential one.

This may seem like splitting hairs, but it is important in this situation. If Joe ultimately decides to surrender his property to his father for fear of retaliation, it is because his context (that his father is an aggressive misopedist, or hates him personally) makes it that moral principles cannot be applied, not that the moral principles have changed. Violence and the threat of violence create a distortion in the moral universe in the same general way that gravity wells distort spacetime. A straight line is no longer straight when distorted by a gravity well, and a desirable action may no longer be desirable when distorted by the threat of violence.

3. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
3a. Why or why not?

This seems to be a leading question, insofar as it assumes the validity of the “good child” construct, which is related to stage three (social conventions). So let me first preface by saying that I do not believe in the “good child” construct. No child is “good” or “bad”: all children react to the environment and familial context they have been placed in. No child can be blamed for being “bad” or praised for being “good,” because these are all arbitrary standards.

That being said, when we look at what the standards are, we find that being a “good child” ultimately means a child that is obedient, a child that does well in school, a child who follows the social constructs put upon it. Based on this, it seems to me that giving the money has something to do with being a “good son,” insofar as giving the money would show obedience to the father. Since I don’t believe in the “good child” construct, the point is moot anyway.

Like I said, the question relies on the acceptance of the “good child” construct. I reject the premise, and therefore cannot answer the question in a way that would make my answer evaluable on the Kohlberg scale.

4. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation?
4a. Why or why not?

I don’t think the fact that Joe earned the money himself is particularly important in this situation. In order to make the arguments I’ve made so far, all we need to establish is that the money is in Joe’s possession legitimately. If he had stolen the money, then the issues would become completely different (although parental authority would not thereby be automatically justified), but that’s not the scenario we have.

Suppose, for instance, that the money was an allowance given to him for food or leisure. This would not confer upon Joe any more obligation to give his father the money. Actually, it would seem to make the father’s demand even more egregious, since the money was given to Joe to serve an essential purpose. But that still would not alter the arguments I’ve already made. Joe would still value his camp more than his father’s fishing trip. The father would still not have the right to order Joe to give him the money. Joe would still not be a “good son” or a “bad son.”

5. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money. Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the situation?
5a. Why or why not?

My general answer here is the same as in the previous question. The fact that the father promise Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money has no bearing on Joe’s possession of the money. The scenario is not based on the father no longer permitting Joe to go to camp, but on the father wanting Joe’s money, and the fact that this would entail Joe not going to camp is an incidental effect. Even if the promise did not exist in this scenario, it still would not justify the father taking the money.

Since I see it as an irrelevant factor, it cannot be the most important thing in the scenario. The most important factor in the scenario is that the money is Joe’s money, not the father’s. All arguments have to rest on this basic fact, and the basic principle that no one has the right to order someone else to arbitrarily surrender money. In any other context, we would call that robbery: if it was accompanied by a threat, we would call it extortion. Only the fact that a child is involved clouds our logic.

6. In general, why should a promise be kept?

I think that implicit in the word “promise” is the notion that it should be kept, so the question seems rather tautological to me. A promise should be kept because that’s what a promise is, an assurance that you will do something. So I think a more fruitful way to approach this question would be: in general, what are reasons to not keep a promise?

I think one major reason not to keep a promise would be learning new information which makes the promise undesirable or impossible to keep for one or both parties. Person A’s promise to person B to help them move is made null and void by person A throwing their back, for example, or person A learning that a loved one is sick and that they must go see them at the hospital on the same date. If they had known that information at the time the promise was made, they would not have made it.

Another reason would be if the promise was made under duress, but then it would hardly be a promise, as knowing you put someone under duress would surely tell you that there’s no assurance that they will actually follow through.

I suppose a stage 6 answer would be something like “promises should be kept because it is more just for all to live in a society where we can trust each other or rely on each other, because otherwise more callous people would be able to take advantage of others by making false promises” or something of the sort, but I don’t think that’s the right kind of answer.

7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don’t know well and probably won’t see again?
7a. Why or why not?

I think it all depends on whether we empathize with that other person. No one is likely to keep a promise to someone they don’t care about and will never see again. But most of us would keep a promise to someone they did care about, even if they would never see them again. I think that the strength of a promise generally is related to the strength of the relation between the parties: a promise made between two close friends is strong, while a promise made between two enemies is not worth a hill of beans (or any quantity of beans, however small).

Is it important? Certainly I would think less of anyone who breaks their promises to anyone, whether they would see them again or not, simply because that shows they are not a very good person. So my answer would be yes. I don’t think the “won’t see again” is particularly important.

8. What do you think is the most important thing a father should be concerned about in his relationship to his son?
8a. Why is that the most important thing?

I think the most important thing a parent should be concerned about in their relationship with their child (no matter the gender of each) is to support, and not interfere in, the natural development of the child. This means that the parent provides the material and psychological support that the child needs (being on the side of the child), while not indoctrinating the child for the parent’s sake.

It is the most important thing because the child’s sole job, the only thing a child should be concerned about, is being a child, and everyone involved in a child’s life should work towards that goal (either by providing material or psychological support, or by preventing undesired indoctrination). There should literally be no goal higher than this for any parent or caretaker. Any indoctrination, any coercion, any demands or orders which do not accord with this goal are wrong. It is not just the most important thing, it is the only thing.

I’m not sure what stage that would qualify as, but it’s definitely not conventional. I don’t believe that social consensus, laws, or social conventions have any bearing whatsoever on the issue of parents’ relationship to their children. The social consensus is that parents should interfere in their children’s lives in order to make them into good adults, and there are no laws against controlling children’s lives (except for things like assault, rape or murder).

9. In general, what should be the authority of a father over his son?
9a. Why?

My answer to this question is a direct consequence of my previous answer. The only justified authority that a parent can have over their child is the authority necessary to provide material or psychological support that the child needs (e.g. the classical example of a parent yanking their child out of the road so they don’t get hit, or helping them through rough times). No other parental authority is desirable or justified.

10. What do you think is the most important thing a son should be concerned about in his relationship to his father?
10a. Why is that the most important thing?

Again, I have to repeat myself: the child’s sole job is to be a child. Children should not be concerned with their relationship with their parents. If they like their parents, then all the better. But if they don’t, then they should not be the ones who have to cultivate the relationship. That’s the parents’ responsibility. So my answer, as unsatisfying as it might be, is: nothing.

11. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Joe to do in this situation?
11a. Why?

To me this question seems rather similar to question 1, except for the word “responsible,” but I’m not sure what it adds to the discussion. Joe has not done anything that he needs to take responsibility for. If anyone did, it is the father, who should take responsibility for giving orders to his child without justification. The responsible thing for the father to do in this situation is to apologize to Joe and tell him that he (Joe) can do whatever he wants with his own money. There is nothing responsible for Joe to do in this situation, because he didn’t do anything wrong.

Well, I hope you liked my answers. If you disagree with me on one of the questions, then please post your own answer in the comments. Since this entry is quite long, I will keep the other dilemma for another entry.

How can we explain human behavior?

I have previously divided explanations of human behavior into three very general categories: anti-causalism (the belief in some non-material explanation, like a soul or free will/agency), adaptationism (the belief that evolutionary adaptations mold behavior), and constructionism (the belief that social conditioning, especially social constructs, mold behavior). I have done so because positions that fall under each category do share a lot in common, and so it is instructive to discuss about them in general terms before we get into the specific. I have gone into specifics, mostly against adaptationist beliefs, in other entries, but in this entry I want to talk about the general categories again.

So one question that adaptationists often raise about my constructionist position is, how would YOU explain why people do what they do? The trouble with adaptationist theories is that they offer a solution that is clear, simple, and completely wrong. It omits all the complexity of human life and turns it into a simple and abstract mechanism of genetic propagation which can be easily understood by thinking about what you imagine hunter-gatherer societies to be like. This is basically a Flintstones view of evolution used as a nice story that explains why people do what they do: they are compelled by their genes, and the genes seek their own “self-interest” (whatever that means for inanimate objects).

My constructionist view is more complicated, because human motivations are more complicated. To fully understand any behavior, we need to fully understand the person first, which is impossible. Anyone who claims to completely understand the motivations for a behavior is lying. We can talk about general incentives that are given to the individual in this or that context, but these are generalities which do not apply to everyone. The specific circumstances of subcultures one is raised in, education, personality, social networks, and so on, change everyone’s response to incentive systems, although those incentive systems are still the dominant influence. Basically, we all either follow, or react against, incentive systems and prevalent belief-systems.

Adaptationism also has its exceptions, but they don’t make much sense. When confronted by the many ways in which non-Western societies break their “evolutionary imperatives,” they say that this must be due to culture. But according to their own theory, culture is constructed by biology, and it makes no sense for certain cultures to somehow push people into doing things that go completely against our very DNA. So there’s really no explanation to be found along these lines.

Let’s just take one simple example, one that is supposed to be one of evolutionary psychology’s strengths: the double standard. They claim that it is genetically advantageous for men to sleep around and for women to seek stable monogamous relationships. However, they have little to reply to examples of non-Western societies, or even some Western examples, where men do not sleep around (or do not have sex at all) or where women do sleep around. From a constructionist perspective, culture is primary, and therefore does not suffer from these problems. Whatever the culture says the role of sex and gender are, most people will follow. In our societies, we are raised to believe that men should be virile and have sex, and that women should want to get married and have children, so that’s what we tend to do. Other societies, with different frameworks around sex and gender, entail different behaviors.

Does that mean that everyone will follow cultural principles? No, clearly not. There are many reasons for that. For instance, we’re all raised in different subcultures and social classes, which influences how we see ourselves and the parts of the culture we adopt or reject. A white boy from the upper class will have a different relation to the culture, to sex, and to gender, than a black girl from the lower class. Also, some small portion of our personality is of genetic origin.

Genetics are not completely irrelevant from the constructionist perspective, they just don’t provide most of the explanatory power needed. Because of the fact that we have human bodies, we generally want to eat, to socialize and share kinship, have sex, have status and admiration, and so on (although these things are not true for everyone). But this does not explain behavior. Human behavior is never simply “to eat” or “to share kinship,” it consists of eating specific things at specific times and in specific ways, of a kinship that is constructed in specific ways. Both of these things are a result of culture, which nearly completely erases the genetic factor.

Social constructs are an important part of constructionism, which is why I call it “constructionism,” because they constitute our identity. Everything that you see as uniquely “you” is a result of social constructs being imposed (or in some cases, not being imposed, like in non-religious families) on “you,” mostly through childhood socialization, but also from other sources such as the mass media and the education system.

The prevalent view about identification nowadays is a view related to adaptationism, in that it posits that our most important identifications are innate (although they would not call it adaptationist at all, and they do not seek evolutionary explanations). Race, gender, sexual orientation, intelligence, are all supposed to be innate, fixed attributes of the individual. Many, although they tend to be more right-wing, also equate social status as being innate.

The problem with this view is that all these things are social constructs, and that ignoring that fact makes it impossible to understand why people identify they way they do. Take a controversial example, that of gender. If you ask a liberal feminist or an SJW for an explanation of why people are the gender that they are, the answer will be: because that’s what their “innate” gender is, it’s what they really are.

Not only is this impossible (because gender is an extremely mutable concept, not just between societies but within the same society at different times), but it also doesn’t explain anything. All it does is transpose the previous uncertainty to another, equally uncertain concept (what that person’s “innate gender” is). An explanation is supposed to start from known data and use that data to show the cause and effect relationship that one is asking about, usually involving the word “because.” For instance, “we had to close down the theater because there was a small fire there.” On the other hand, “they are a man because they are innately a man” helps specify what they think gender is but it doesn’t explain it.

From the constructionist standpoint, gender is a social construct. That includes the gender roles, the gender stereotypes, the gender hierarchy, everything. We are all assigned a gender at birth based (arbitrarily) on our sex. We (for most people, if not all) have parts of our personality, or beliefs, which clash with the stereotype of our assigned gender, but we go along with it anyway. Some people refuse to go along with it to some extent (mostly due to being homosexual, which goes against both gender roles in the West), and they become gender rebels of one kind or another.

This view provides us with a basic explanation. If you know the gender stereotypes in their culture (or subculture, if their family is part of a subculture that has views on gender), and you know someone’s personality and beliefs to some extent, you can, to that extent, figure out how comfortable they would be with their assigned gender.

In general we can say that the categories through which people identify themselves are based around the kinds of social constructs that exist in their culture or subculture, and the way they identify comes as obedience to, or reaction against, those social constructs. Gender is only a point of identification because gender is an extremely important kind of social construct in our societies, and people identify as one gender or the other, or as no gender at all, depending on their reactions to the gender stereotypes they are taught.

I’ve mostly talked about constructionism and adaptationism. However, as readers of my blog know, I don’t think much of anti-causalism either. Religious anti-causalists blather on and on about how one’s soul can be saved or wicked, depending on what religion one “chooses” (how one comes to “choose” a specific religion over any other is never explained), and how people who do things they disagree with are demonic. Secular anti-causalists usually deploy the concepts of free will and agency, which are unfalsifiable and don’t explain anything either. But that’s to be expected, because the concept of the soul and the concept of free will are used to bury the truth in unnecessary verbiage, not to actually explain anything. Until someone proves that some non-material entity or process can somehow be measured and be shown to effect material bodies, I see no reason to believe in either of them.