Category Archives: Anti-capitalism/usury/STV

Why has the concept of self-ownership persisted?

I have extensively covered how self-ownership is irrational and contradictory (see here, here and here). In this entry, I am concerned with why. Why has the error of self-ownership taken such an importance in Western thought?

If any study can tell us this, it must be the study of our mental frames, which reveal the hidden structure of our thoughts. We mostly think in metaphors because abstracts can only be understood by referring to direct experience (e.g. we understand TIME as MONEY, as a VALUABLE COMMODITY, as a LIMITED RESOURCE). I think the way we Westerners metaphorically grasp the concept of the self is the source of the error.

Let’s start with the concept of ownership, since it’s less abstract and simpler than the concept of self. Relations of ownership are taught to us as a part of life from childhood and they are very easily understood. They are an integral part of metaphors we use about objects and resources (such as TIME IS A RESOURCE, where we say things like “you are wasting MY time” or “I don’t HAVE any time for you”), such a mundane part of them that they are usually not even worth mentioning.

Ownership, I think, is a basic physical experience shared by most humans, which has as part of its prototype:

1. Ownership takes place between two entities, an owner and an owned.
2. The owner is a single person.
3. The owned is a single material object.
4. The owner has direct physical control over the owned.
5. The owner can exclude others from controlling the owned.
6. The owner came to acquire the owned through legitimate (legal) means.

Now when we talk about the prototype of a concept, we’re talking about the mental image we have of it, not a definition. For example, a robin is closer to the prototype of birds than a penguin or an ostrich.

A prototypical ownership relation would be one between a hunter and a spear, or between a farmer and a house. These examples follow all five points I’ve listed. Other relations only follow some of these points. For example, ownership of common land by a town or community fulfills 4, 5 and 6, but not 1, 2 or 3 (except if you take into account the metaphor LAND IS A CONTAINER, which turns a piece of land into a singular object, which fulfills 3).

I think 4 and 5 are probably the most important prototypical elements, because it is in terms of exclusive control that most people formally define property.

Now, we do have the experience of ownership (toys, pets, etc.) at an early age…

My property is something I control. Because it is mine, I don’t have to beg permission of anyone to use it. There is no hindrance to my use of it. But what is not my property typically belongs to someone else. If I want to use it, I must beg another for permission.

According to the linked article about the Stoic conception of self, the self is a property owner, and the objective of the individual self is to not desire anything that is not its property (e.g. things that are not choices, desires or aversions), so as not to be in a position of weakness (lack of self-control).

This brings us to the concept of the self. According to Johnson and Lakoff in Philosophy in the Flesh, the primary fact we need to understand about the self is that we understand it in terms of a metaphor of a relationship between two people. There is a fundamental dichotomy between the subject and the self: they are the metaphorical equivalent of two wholly different people. The relation between the two can be adversarial, parental, friendly, or authoritarian, but in all cases “I” does not equate with “my self.”

This has profound implications for our understanding of the self. For one thing, it is the only way in which “self-ownership” can make any sense at all. Equating the subject with the self nullifies any possibility of framing the self as a relation of ownership, since that implies two different entities.

Going further into the nature of the self, Johnson and Lakoff identify three main metaphors used to understand the self specifically: SELF IS A CONTAINER (e.g. “out of your mind,” “take a good look at yourself”), SELF IS A SERVANT (e.g. “I don’t know what to do with myself”) and SELF IS A STANDARD (e.g. “be true to yourself”).

Let’s start with the more basic metaphor, the SELF IS A CONTAINER. As a CONTAINER IS AN OBJECT, this leads us to the conclusion that the SELF IS AN OBJECT. I think this leads us pretty directly to the notion of the soul, if we add to the mix the Christian notion of life after death (which the body, being corruptible, obviously can’t join).

More importantly, it leads us to a relation which almost perfectly fits our prototype of ownership: there is an owner (the self, which is both an object and “me” at the deepest level) and an owned object (the body/subject), total control (of the self over the body), compete exclusion (only one self can exist in any given body, barring things like DID). I’ve pointed out before how this is wrong, so I am not going to repeat it here.

The other two metaphors may seem to contradict, at first glance. But Johnson and Lakoff point out that they pertain to different things. When we say “I don’t know what to do with myself,” the “myself” refers to the physical body. But when we say “be true to yourself,” the “yourself” refers to some inner voice or thought, not to the physical body.

Of course the former is perfectly in line with the bizarre relation of self-ownership (body as servant-being, thing that is owned). And I think that in the latter there are definite connections to the soul (as an incorruptible part of us that is connected to the supernatural realm) and to the conscience, the secular equivalent of the soul (as a moral standard that one should follow).

It’s blindingly obvious that we urgently need updated metaphors to understand the concept of self, because our current ones do us a great disservice. The concept of self-ownership has been a great and destructive error in Western thought, and has provided theoretical impetus for capitalism and neo-liberalism.

I think that to counter this, we need to present two complementary accounts of the self: one of the self as social agent (in order to dispel the myth of vulgar individualism), and another of the self as not being controlled (in order to dispel the myth of self-control).

I am no linguist, but here are two ideas in this vein. One is the metaphor of MIND IS A RIVER. Like the waters of a river, thoughts flow outside of our control, and we are only riding on them. We can talk about the speed of this flow (slow or fast thinking), the depth of the river (depth of ideas), the clarity of the river (clarity of a person’s reasoning). We can also use the metaphor to illustrate the relation between the stream of thoughts and the conscious mind through the relation between a person and the river.

Another metaphor could be that of SELF AS A PLANT. This is not perfect by any stretch, but I think we can get a lot of mileage out of it. Like selves, plants depend on their environment to come into existence and flourish: like humans, they are not self-made. Furthermore, researchers have been discovering that plants communicate with each other in a wide variety of ways (chemically in the air, underground, and by sound), which could emphasize the need for cooperation between human beings.

These are just some suggestions I came up with. Post in the comments if you can think of better metaphors.

Impositionists and their problems with consent.

In this entry, I want to make some general observations about some common characteristics that impositionists seem to share. When I say “impositionists,” I am referring to people who hold to an ideology which explicitly advocates imposing harm.

Invariably they have reasons why such imposition is just or reasonable (e.g. innate evil or sinful nature, innate gender, the innate stupidity of children and other species, might makes right, etc). I do not care about these reasons, or at least not in this entry. All I will say is that only the limit cases (e.g. saving someone’s life by pulling them out of harm’s way) have been proven justified; every systemic imposition of harm in our society is blatantly unjustified. Of course they don’t really care about justification anyway: harmful power has no motive to deconstruct itself, only its victims do.

* They have major issues with consent.

My first issue is that of consent. Consent is a vitally important topic because it represents the bare minimum standard that must be met by any action for it to be non-coercive; advocates of most ideologies are keenly interested in portraying them as non-coercive for the same general reason as advocates of some pseudo-science want to portray it as scientific: being explicitly unscientific or coercive is considered bad form in this day and age.

So again let me list the criteria for consent to be present. First, the obvious:

1. There must be a clear signal of approval of the action.

This is merely a slight extension of the standard definition. And now, for the corollaries:

2. If there is no signal that one or the other party would accept as a refusal (no alternative), then there can be no signal of approval either, and no consent.
3. A signal of agreement given where there is a credible alternative, but said alternative is not viable due to pre-existing conditions, is as invalid as one given without actual alternatives.
4. Any signal of agreement given under a threat of force is the product of duress, not approval, and is therefore not consent.
5. In a situation where one of the parties cannot communicate, there can be no consent.
6. If the signal of agreement cannot be given prospectively (i.e. to the action itself), then there is no possibility of consent for that action.

I would say that all impositionist ideologies break at least one of these principles. Before I get into examples, I do want to point out that probably all these ideologies fall into most categories I’ve listed, and when I say that a given ideology breaks a particular point, I am not by any means implying that there’s nothing else wrong with its attitude towards consent.

***

* Most religions heavily rely on childhood indoctrination in order to propagate. This breaks point 3, as childhood indoctrination is most definitely a “pre-existing condition” that makes alternatives (to belief in the religion one was raised in) non-viable. A person cannot be meaningfully said to consent to anything that they’ve been indoctrinated to believe (e.g. we don’t say a cult member consented to the hardships of being in a cult, such as false imprisonment or human trafficking).

The religious call it “freedom of religion.” They are incapable of explaining how being indoctrinated and peer pressured into a religion which keeps you in by threatening eternal torment has anything to do with “freedom.”

* Genderism is similar to religion in that it’s indoctrinated from the youngest age, and therefore there cannot be any freedom to live without some conception of gender, gender hierarchy and gender roles (which are all the same thing). It’s equally meaningless to say that the performance of gender is consensual, in any form.

* Statism always assumes that anyone born within a nation’s borders “implicitly consents” to whatever the State makes into law. As a citizen, you simply have no means to signal disagreement with the law, breaking point 2 (prejudice against prisoners would also enter into this).

Yes, I know, the standard argument is that voting is the signal of agreement. But that’s not really true, is it? Otherwise non-voters could veto any law applied to them, which obviously does not happen.

Another argument is that staying in a country is the signal of agreement to the laws of that country. But we don’t use this “go away if you don’t like the rules” in any other context. Either way, it’s only further proof that there’s no means to signal disagreement (compare to telling a child “you can’t get beaten by your dad if you just run away!”).

Related to statism is imperialism and neo-liberalism, which follow the same general pattern, except applied to other countries. You will be liberated whether you like it or not; consent is always assumed.

* Capitalism relies on pre-existing conditions for its docile workforce (poverty, expensive education, creation of artificial unemployment, need for medical insurance in the US). It is therefore part of point 3. The conditions that make capitalism possible (property rights, money system, corporatism) are set by States, so what I’ve said for statism applies here as well.

The usual sort of reply you get to capitalist consent issues is that no one has to take any specific job. That may be so, but it doesn’t provide an alternative to capitalism. Faced with the massive inequality, environmental destruction, human rights violations, objectification, servility and conformity inherent in capitalism, it’s natural to want alternatives. People do not naturally want to work for other people’s profit margin or to have no control over what they produce.

* As a way of often dealing with having limited possibilities (or no possibilities, in the case of trafficked women) within the capitalist system and often as a result of parental abuse ingrained in the personality, prostitution is also part of point 3.

* Natalism, insofar as it assumes consent to being born where consent cannot be obtained, breaks point 5. The usual natalist answer is that we should assume implicit consent because it’s necessary in order for them to experience the pleasures of being alive (compare with: brown people implicitly consent to us “liberating” them and will be happy later, after we’re done killing them).

But mostly natalists just don’t care about consent, because they assume that the impossibility of consent is a carte blanche to do anything you want, which is absolutely illogical and delusional. Impossibility of consent basically means you are not allowed to do anything, because consent is, again, the absolute bare minimum criterion.

* Pornography and BDSM both fall under point 6: they both pretend to be concerned with consent and contracts, but only prospectively, which means that there can be no agreement on specific acts.

Advocates would, I suppose, argue that a contract is enough agreement to signal consent to any act that’s part of it. But if you sign a contract to perform a series of acts, and then no longer wish to perform one of the acts but are coerced or intimidated into performing it, that’s rape pure and simple. No contract can contradict this fact.

* Misopedia and carnism, two ideologies which posit a hierarchy where children/other species occupy the bottom rung, both partake of point 1, because they just don’t care if children or other species consent. The “lower intelligence” argument supposedly justifies exploiting children and other species. Guess who gets to define intelligence? Adult humans, of course. Surprise, surprise.

When you do point out to misopedists and carnists that they are simply ignoring consent issues, they will use the “lower intelligence” argument to posit that children/other species cannot consent, therefore justifying coercion against them. Again, this is logical nonsense.

***

I cannot think of a single ideology which explicitly creates harm and does not also attack consent in some way. This is not too surprising, as they are also all hierarchies, hierarchies set people apart as superiors and inferiors, and inferiors cannot have the same freedoms as their superiors; a child cannot have the same freedom as a parent, a cow cannot have the same freedom as a human, a sub cannot have the same freedom as a dom, a worker cannot have the same freedom as a boss. There must be some imposition, and that imposition cannot be consensual (the superior-inferior relation is based on obedience backed by power, not consent), for a hierarchy to be maintained.

Note that you could do this same analysis with the term “scientific” and show how various pseudo-sciences line up.

What is the perspective on consent from their perspective? One credible model was made by Tom W. Bell and is called the “scale of consent”:

Now, from a rational standpoint, only the very first item on this scale- “negociated exchange”- is actually a form of consent (“standardized exchange” implies giving consent prospectively, which breaks point 5), so the idea that the top half represents different forms of consent is complete bullshit. “Negociated exchange” is basically consent, the rest of the top half represents all the non-consent that impositionists claim as consent.

If we look at this scale, not as any sort of truth, but as a tool to help us understand how impositionists think, then I think this scale can be used as a complement to my list of points. It’s basically a chart version of the impositionist’s rationalization playbook.

For example, consider “custom” as signal of consent. That is an exact description of cultural relativism and how it provides support for customs such as female genital mutilation, suttee, foot-binding and prostitution, to name only those. It is assumed that because it’s “their/our culture,” that the issue of consent is automatically resolved.

Granted, proponents of cultural relativism would not state outright that they think there can be no consent issues. Rather, they would say that we, as outsiders, have no grounds to criticize the practice, but this really amounts to the same thing; we are after all talking about harmful, non-consensual practices, and therefore suppressing criticism about them is the same thing as evacuating consent issues.

The concepts of “standardized exchange” and “consent per past agreements” are often used to justify rape, especially spousal rape. Marriage is supposedly a contract which grants mutual sexual ownership, and therefore spousal rape is seen as just sex. It’s also often argued that past interactions justify sexual demands (you made out with me, so you should let me fuck you).

Likewise, “hypothetical consent” is reflected in many different areas. Take the natalist justification “the vast majority of people are happy, therefore anyone would want to be born.” That’s purely hypothetical, since there’s no way to gauge a state of non-existence: anyone who is happy also exists, and has vested interests in being optimistic. It does not mean that e.g. a hypothetical person in Rawls’ Original Position would always want to come into existence. In fact, it seems more likely (from the antinatalist perspective) that a fully informed person in such a position would decline existence.

* They refuse to quantify the risk of harm.

Impositionists have to ignore the harm their ideology causes because that would mean they are cheering for the perpetrators, not the victims, which is why they have to claim victimhood in any way possible. Statists build up the big bad leftists and Anarchists as their persecutors, capitalists scream about the “entitlement” of poor people, the religious demonize anyone who stands in the way of their pseudo-moral agenda, parents claim to be slaves to their children, and so on.

Related to this fundamental dishonesty is the fact that impositionists refuse to quantify the risk they are willing to impose on others. For instance, I asked anti-abortion and pro-choice advocates to quantify the risk they bring about, and very few even tried. Of course they cannot, for doing so means no longer ignoring the harm their ideology causes.

I admit that asking such a question puts the person between a rock and a hard place: who wants to say they want such and such number of children to die as a result of their cause? But if you have this problem, why do you believe in an ideology that entails the death of children in the first place? Shouldn’t that make you think?

The quantification of risk can, and should, be asked for all ideologies which promote harm. For instance, here’s one that has been asked about pornography:

And a serious question for porn users in general: what’s the maximum percentage of risk you’re willing to accept that the scene you’re getting off to has a performer who was coerced into participating, who couldn’t consent to participating, who was forced to perform acts she was uncomfortable with or explicitly barred, who didn’t consent to the distribution of the material? Give me a number.

But we can make similar questions for everything else, too. In all cases, what we’re trying to find out is: what’s the point where the implementation or fulfillment of the ideology entails just too much harm? And most importantly, how do we determine that point?

That would be the start of any real discussion on the ethicality of harm and risk. But impositionists will not, and probably cannot, have such discussions (feel free to prove me wrong!).

* They treat people as means to an end.

This can be deduced easily from what I’ve said so far. Impositionists see other people, especially their inferiors, as resources to be controlled (non-consensually) by a hierarchy to achieve some level of control over society. Impositionists see harming other people as a tradeoff, that it’s okay to do so in the name of some higher goal, which is really some level of control over society. All of that is very anti-freedom, anti-individual and anti-human.

If there is any ethical principle that should be obvious, clear and basic, it is that we should not treat other human beings as means to an end. It is the most basic form of egalitarianism that one could conceive.

* They all fail the Chomsky Principle.

I’ve discussed before what I call the Chomsky Principle, that we should in principle reject any hierarchical relation or structure unless it’s proven to be justified in some way.

[T]he basic principle I would like to see communicated to people is the idea that every form of authority and domination and hierarchy, every authoritarian structure, has to prove that it’s justified- it has no prior justification. For instance, when you stop your five-year-old kid from trying to cross the street, that’s an authoritarian situation: it’s got to be justified. Well, in that case, I think you can give a justification. But the burden of proof for any exercise of authority is always on the person exercising it- invariably. And when you look, most of the time these authority structures have no justification: they have no moral justification, they have no justification in the interests of the person lower in the hierarchy, or in the interests of other people, or the environment, or the future, or the society, or anything else- they’re just there in order to preserve certain structures of power and domination, and the people at the top.

Noam Chomsky, Understanding Power

“Communism has been tried, and failed!”

A common, popular line of argumentation against communism (some might say, the end of all discussion about communism) holds that communism has been tried and failed, so we shouldn’t talk or think about it any longer.

I guess what we’re butting against here is good ol’ pragmatism. As for any other pragmatic argument, we must first ask: on what standard(s) are we to evaluate whether it “failed”?

If the standard for “failed” is that it no longer exists, well, communism still exists in some places, therefore communism has not yet “failed.”

If the standard for “failed” is that it does not raise the standard of living for people (by which I mean not just economically but socially as well), then communism “succeeded,” because it did raise the standard of living in the USSR. Indeed, when communism ended, the standard of living dropped.

If the standard for “failed” is that it has killed millions of people, then capitalism and democracy have also “failed.” The Black Book of Communism states that 94 million people died due to communism (a questionable claim in itself); the estimates of capitalism’s death toll is estimated at one billion plus, not counting all the deaths caused by neo-liberalism around the world. But who’s counting?

Is it that communism was “defeated”? Well, democracy in Ancient Greece was defeated by the Roman Empire, so democracy is a “failed” system and we should not talk about it any more. We should immediately replace all democratic governments with autocratic governments. Right? Well obviously that doesn’t work, because democracy is “good.”

What about Christianity? Christianity is responsible for countless deaths, including the Inquisition, the native american genocide, and the persecution of the Jews. Christian doctrines were used to fight against measures which raised the standard of living for all, including abolitionism, feminism, gay rights, abortion, and so on. Christianity, as an ideology, reforms itself very slowly and is always behind the times.

Granted, Christianity has not been defeated yet. It is still very much a force for evil around the world. But it will not survive forever (unless we exterminate each other in the centuries to come).

The fact is that no system of thought is eternal. And how do we deal with transformation and renewals? Capitalism and democracy have both gone through a number of iterations, adapting to the exigencies of successive eras (e.g. classical liberalism, imperialism, fascism). So has anarchism, for that matter.

Anarchism of course has been suppressed by States on many occasions and therefore has “failed.” But it still exists, has raised the standard of living for people whenever it has been put into operation, and has not killed as many people as either capitalism or communism. So by these standards, anarchism is more “successful.”

But either way, what does it matter? Pragmatism is not a fair standard of evaluation of anything, because, as in this case, it is based on some implicit, unquestioned standard of “working.” People want to talk about communism being a “failure” as a way to shut down discussion about it. It connects with our mainstream desire for “success” in all domains: who wants to be associated with “losers”? Radicals are less likely to care about “success” or “failure” and to care more about ethical principles.

I would go beyond the principle that no system of thought is eternal, and say that no principle at all (including this one!) is eternal. A principle may be formulated to hold true in a wide variety of contexts, but it is generally not made to be true in all possible contexts. This is true even in science, where even the most stable principles of physics break down near Planck time.

Comparing self-ownership and self-objectification.

A discussion in the comments between myself and cyanidecupcake led me to consider the differences between self-ownership and self-objectification.

Ownership is, fundamentally, a relation between one individual and society as a whole regarding control over some man-made object (ownership cannot logically be derived from a state of non-ownership, therefore it is logically impossible to justify ownership of natural resources). Using the power inherent in society, we all make a deal that anyone who tries to usurp that control may be violently stopped. Depending on the scope of the control, we may call this system property, rent, commons, and so on.

Objectification means to abstract human beings as purely physical objects of desire, and to evaluate women based on the sole standard of how much they fulfill socially constructed male desires, a process which we call the male gaze. In short, it separates oneself as a subject and the other as an object, as long as one sees oneself as a human being. Objectification is a process which inscribes itself within Patriarchy as a form of devaluation of women and exploitation of women’s bodies.

At first glance, there does not seem to be any connection between the two concepts. But remember that I argued that hierarchy is property, and the Patriarchy is, amongst other things, the expression of gender hierarchy, meaning that men as a class claim ownership over women as a class. This claim used to be legal and literal; nowadays in the Western world it thankfully has no more legal status, although we still operate under most of its corollaries (e.g. the rape culture, pressure to marry and have children, near-universal objectification).

I’ve already extensively discussed self-ownership, so I will not start another such discussion here. Self-ownership, briefly put, is the logically impossible concept of a human being owning emself, and is used to justify property rights and the absence of positive rights (therefore the absence of actual rights for the individual, since actual rights require positive rights) under ideal capitalism.

Self-objectification is the result of an individual woman integrating the male gaze and adapting herself to its requirements. This means that the woman starts seeing herself as an sexual object and evaluating herself based on the fuckability mandate.

Because objectification is a class phenomenon, self-objectification arises because women are told how to conform through a mediation system composed primarily of parenting and its gender mania, the mass media and its constant objectification, and authority pressure. These factors are all consistently far more oppressive than the society they exist in, because they all have vested interests in preserving gender roles, even if there may be disagreement on how exactly those roles should be apportioned.

Further muddling the issue is that self-objectification in a patriarchal society creates its own reward system (secondary gains for being an obedient inferior).

I bet there are plenty of women who have, from time to time, felt flattered by a look or compliment in the street. There are many more who have felt threatened, unsafe, and angered by being yelled at out the window of a passing truck or stared down on public transit. Whatever Lees feelings and experiences are is fine — what isn’t “fine” is to write an entire article about how great being objectified makes her feel without acknowledging that these feelings aren’t about “mating calls” so much as they are about patriarchy.

Being admired by men for one’s own body can be very gratifying, but it comes at the price of one’s full person (including one’s desires, feelings and intelligence) being rejected. This is a no-win situation for all women: the women who actively pursue the male gaze cannot win because they will never be recognized as full human beings (no matter whether you’re a porn actress, a scientist, or prime minister), and the women who do not pursue the male gaze cannot win because they will automatically be classified as marginal. This is a crummy game where the table is rigged and the dice are weighted.

Competition between women is another obvious effect of self-objectification. If the individual woman is an object and the role of that object is to attract male attention, then other (self-objectifying) women are necessarily competitors. And this will be magnified in male-dominated areas, the areas where women need to cooperate the most.

This leads me to market competition. Women already start at a disadvantage, since they get paid less and are generally seen as less competent than the men in their field. I have little to add on these topics that hasn’t already been said before.

But there’s another issue, and here is where self-ownership and self-objectification join up. If we understand self-ownership as an economic process (I look at myself as an object which produces and is controlled by that process of production), then we can understand that we’re simply looking at two facets of objectification: the human being as a sexual object (object of desire) and as a commodity (object of profitability).

As a worker, you are conceived as a resource (a “human resource”) which must be exploited optimally in order to generate a maximum of profits. As an individual, you must internalize this conception and see yourself as an object of profitability in order to appear valuable to your employers. Failing to do so means you are more likely to lose the game.

Permit me to extend this reasoning even further. As some readers may have noticed, evolutionary psychology is one of my pet topics when we’re talking about explanations for human action, and I think it’s relevant here as well.

I have already pointed out that evopsych is incompatible with individuality, because it is predicted on the (unjustified) assumption that the individual is merely a vehicle for genetically transmitted behavioral strategies which are hardcoded in every human brain. The individual, in this view, is not an active subject but a passive robot, as Richard Dawkins eloquently tells us:

We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes.

This is an extremely bleak view of human existence. It’s also inaccurate. For one thing, sequences of genes are not selfish, or even entities for that matter. For another, there is a gigantic leap between the fact that certain sequences of genes have an extremely tenuous connection to the organism’s survival and stating that our identity revolves around preserving genes. We are blindly programmed survival machines, sure, but that has little to do with preserving genes.

According to evopsych, men are programmed to objectify women and cheat on them, women are programmed to be attracted to men who have more resources, men and women are programmed to seek different kinds of work, and so on. It universalizes the worse of conditioned Western gender roles as innate human impulses. As I see it, the psychological objectification inherent in evopsych leads to justifying sexual objectification and commodification as well.

Incidentally, there is evidence that self-objectification correlates with women being less likely to engage in feminist activism. To me this seems to lead into a vicious circle: objectification leads to lower activism, which leads to less voices speaking counter to the mediation system, which leads to more objectification.

Maybe we should say objectification is selfish too. That makes about as much sense as selfish genes.

Politics is an occultation of power and violence.


From Jen Sorensen.

The fundamental principles of political discourse are not freedom, right, choice or equality. As I’ve previously discussed, these terms actually have three different levels of meaning, which fluctuate depending on the person using them. So for instance there are three kinds of freedom, following the three kinds of power:

1. Freedom- from condign power (force).
2. Freedom- from compensatory power (money).
3. Freedom- from conditioned power (indoctrination).

Based on this nomenclature, we may call the “freedom” discussed by voluntaryists and Libertarians freedom1, because it only takes into account condign power. Your standard socialist may be closer to freedom1,2. As for your run-of-the-mill statists who talk about freedom while accepting all forms of power, we can talk about non-freedom or perhaps freedom0.

If our concept of power underlies every use of those other concepts, then it must be more fundamental. What differentiates political ideologies, then, must be their conception of power?

Although I can’t say I know the answer to this question, I haven’t yet found a political issue or question which does not revolve around identifying power, because all arguments around freedom or rights ultimately are about power.

Take the issue of abortion, for example. Anti-abortion proponents argue that abortion is murder and that a fetus has a “right to life”; this reasoning can only make sense if one has already assumed that a pregnant woman is using condign power on another human being, therefore they must redefine fetuses as human beings. So their view of abortion is that of a woman having power over, and murdering, another human being.

The narratives people use to illustrate their political positions serve to reinforce the patterns of power and privilege they assume exist in society. So for instance we have the narrative that women are going around getting abortions as a form of birth control, that they are uncaring, callous, and so on, reinforcing the murderer image.

But if abortion is murder in itself, then why would we need to emphasize the perpetrator’s callousness? You’d think that murder in itself would be more than enough indictment. Obviously the goal is to make us believe in the power of the pregnant woman over the fetus. The fact that women treat fetuses callously “proves” that they are superior on some hierarchy, since we know superiors treat inferiors callously (as all our institutions demonstrate).

Of course the real root of the error about abortion is religio-cultural, centered around genderism (see this entry), not political. People are not anti-abortion on the basis of failing at identifying power and privilege correctly. But inevitably their beliefs about abortion, once formulated, will reflect this logical failure.

Now take the example of social safety nets. Neo-liberalist opponents of safety nets correctly identify condign power as the ultimate basis of government, and rightly oppose this, but they refuse to identify compensatory power and its profound effects on society. Not only do they support a corporate and neo-liberalist apparatus that is more powerful than most world governments, but said apparatus also depends on the very condign power of government and the safety nets that they decry (except they call them “bailouts” instead of “welfare”).

Their stance on power is a direct contradiction, which can only lead to a muddled ideology (here is one example). They believe that social safety nets are “entitlement.” They assume that our current property scheme and distribution scheme are not only the way things should be, but the “natural” way for things to be (as demonstrated by the invalid term “property rights“), and this is how they convince people to ignore corporate power and condign power used in its support.

Another example is genderism (traditional genderism and trans genderism both), which is based on the bizarre notion that women have privilege just by virtue of being women, despite a history of five thousand years of Patriarchy.

The common thread between all these errors is a complete denial of any greater historical or scientific context, which leads to errors about the power and privilege that exists. I have talked about this phenomenon at an individual level (the atomistic mindset), and there’s no great difference between that and applying it at the social level; all you have to do is apply the same concept of actions existing in a vacuum to an entire group of people. The more you simplify a situation, the more you can apply linear logic to it, but the more disconnected from reality your conclusion will be.

Obviously statists are highly motivated to misunderstand the scope of power, because their preferred paradigm (whether religious, political or philosophical) support some form of power. Like theology, whose arguments serve a pre-existing conclusion, their beliefs about power serve a pre-existing ideology.

Okay, now consider a different tack to this question. Stating existing property relations as justification cannot be valid because our property relations exist solely because of a specific property scheme, and the property schemes we use in Western societies are not universal or logically necessary.

So we have giant megacorporations that produce most of what we eat, what we interact with, what the government fights with, and so on. Those giant megacorporations exist because of a legal and cultural framework where capitalist work contracts, corporate personhood, corporate welfare, and so on, are seen as valid (if seen as objectionable by some). So one cannot then turn around and argue that megacorporations are the “natural” order of a large-scale economy; there is nothing “natural” about it, it’s entirely socially constructed.

Now consider the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP). The principle that one should not initiate force seems superficially noble (and similar to my Prime Directive, with one crucial difference), but in practice it is meaningless because what one defines as “aggression” depends entirely on what one considers human rights and property.

So let’s take taxation as an example, because it’s a common application of the NAP. Again, neo-liberalists correctly identify taxation as ultimately backed by the force of arms, like all forms of State action. They also posit that taxation is aggression, more specifically theft, based on the NAP, which is where we run into trouble; taxation can only be aggression if we presume that the money belonged to the taxpayer in the first place and that no one has any obligation to their society.

It may be argued that such a view is dictatorial, which is really besides the point; but let’s suppose we set up the same kind of scenario, but this time comparing a socialist ownership scheme with our current property scheme: workers taking over an abandoned factory in Argentina and using it for their own self-managed labour.

Under any legal system which does not function on the basis of self-management, such an act is a highly illegal form of squatting on valuable means of production, and is typically met with beatings and arrests. Under this view, the workers are the aggressors. But under a socialist ownership scheme, such an action is perfectly warranted and just: the workers do own their means of production and are perfectly within their rights to commandeer them. Under this view, the capitalist owners are the aggressors.

My point is not that all property schemes are equally valid (as a socialist, I obviously think the workers are in the right in that last scenario). My point is that determining who is an aggressor and who is a victim cannot be done without starting from a specific conception of property and human rights. Proponents of the NAP, being mostly capitalists, would say that the workers are the aggressors; the correct reply is to point out that this evaluation is based on the unjustified assumption that capitalist property schemes are just and natural.

To come back to the first example, the most obvious problem with taxation is not that it is theft; our taxation system is no more or less theft than our property scheme, and the latter is enforced with a far more extensive use of power than the former. The real problem with taxation is that the money is managed by the State, which has little to no interest in fulfilling its own obligations to society, let alone support our obligations to each other.

The same general problem applies to the term “non-initiation of force.” We can only determine who initiated force by having a prior conception of the situations where it is appropriate and not appropriate to act on other human beings, that is to say a conception of human rights.

You may complain that it is very easy to figure out when someone initiates force: your rights end where my nose begins, and so on. Well this is a very narrow definition of force; consider, for example, a boxing match, or the pollution of someone’s property. In the former, people’s noses are very much invaded but there is no force involved because both parties have consented to the match, while in the latter, no one’s nose is necessarily being invaded but the pollution is an initiation of force against the person, again because of lack of consent. As I’ve said before, consent is not a sufficient standard, but it is a necessary one.

So let’s go back to the example with the workers again. Who initiated force? Let us assume that the owner did not use force in firing the workers. The workers likewise did not initiate any force by taking over the means of production. Neither action usually involves any violence. So it seems that, in that scenario, the initiation of force lies with the apparatus which is tasked with defending property and its owners’ interests (the cops, the courts and the State as a whole), thereby demonstrating again that any property scheme is necessarily backed by force.

Replying that the workers initiated force by using what was not theirs would simply make my point that the conception of force depends on how we define ownership (what is “theirs” and “not theirs”).

I think I’ve made my point sufficiently clear. Force and aggression are not fundamental concepts, because they depend on one’s conception of rights and property; but in parallel with that, all property schemes and conceptions of rights depend on aggression and force in order to exist. Property can most concretely be expressed as a relation between one individual (the owner) and the rest of society: if you take “my” stuff (for any definition of “my”), violence may be used against you.

All politics by definition is violence, so non-violence, NAP and all other such ideologies are not an option (non-violence is at most a luxury). Politicians have to occult this fact because they must maintain the pretense that they are fulfilling a sacred duty to the people, guarding freedom, and so on and so forth. The real question, to anyone who cares about the truth, is: to what ends should we apply violence?

Obviously there are situations where we want to tell other people what to do, and to use force if necessary: we don’t want innocent people to be killed, physically harmed or threatened of such, we don’t want people to be deprived of their life or livelihood, we don’t want people to be deprived of their freedom without at least an excellent reason. Their importance is why we call these things “rights.” Rights are those things we think violence must be used to protect because they are that important.

From a libsoc standpoint, hierarchy is property, therefore the debate revolves around freedom/equality on the one hand, and property/hierarchy on the other. Freedom/equality/non-property ownership/non-hierarchical society necessarily entail no government and no capitalism. Power and violence should both be minimized, because they are unjust and unrealiable tools of governance; when they are to be used at all, they should be distributed as equitably as possible and hopefully used to further the aims of social cooperation, instead of hindering it.

Considering competition as a form of woman-hating.

In a previous entry, I discussed the connections in what I called the Axis of Woman-Hating: natalism (women as a means to the end of procreation), anti-feminism (women are sex objects) and genderism (nature made women inferior).

Obviously there are some connections missing there, and I was only getting at the major ones. Capitalism would be another good example. The difference is that there is nothing that leads us logically from the private ownership of the means of production to woman-hating, but historically there is a strong connection between forms of capitalism (including fascism and State communism) and forms of woman-hating, usually connected to procreation and the family.

Sexism aids the capitalist system. The family provides a base for the reproduction and bringing up of future workers and the servicing and care of current (and unemployed) workers and retired workers.

This work which, in the home, is usually carried out unpaid by women (who may also work outside the home) saves capitalism millions of pounds, increasing the profits of a few.

The capitalist system could exist perfectly well without woman-hating, but it depends on it in various ways. Racism is a good analogy: slavery was economically beneficial to the elites of pre-industrial societies, therefore it was allowed to remain, while industrialization made slavery undesirable to the elites and therefore became illegal. Nowadays racism manifests itself economically in the exploitation of immigrants for cheap labor and the use of poc as an expendable working class.

As the quote points out, capitalism needs to exploit women’s free labor in order to maintain a strict separation between work and family and, in a wider view, to maintain the population of the worker base.

So the connection to the other forms of woman-hating is pretty obvious. In all these ideologies, women are seen not as full persons but as means to an end: the end of mindless procreation, the end of sustaining the factitious family structure, the end of the widespread exploitation of women by men and the intellectual justification of that exploitation.

One of the core ideas of capitalism is competition. The idea sounds good in the abstract, if you don’t really think about the social context, but in practice competition leads to lower creativity and higher conformity, lower efficiency, lower motivation (especially when coupled with monetary rewards), and is least conducive to learning in schools. These results have been confirmed by so many studies that they are some of the most solid conclusions of the social sciences (see No Contest by Alfie Kohn for a review of these studies).

Already we run into a problem, because the kind of conformity that competing individuals follow has for the most part been established by men. Women stick out in male-dominated professions and are trapped in a lose-lose situation: either assimilate and be judged as a bitch and a ball-buster, or resist and be passed for promotions and recognition.

The old “having it all” bromide really means: that a woman should first and foremost fulfill her gendered function as an unpaid homemaker (and therefore to be unproductive according to capitalist standards), and second pursue a career and be a productive worker who is able to compete in the job market. Not only are women expected to shoulder a double burden, but they’re supposed to relish doing so in order to be a “modern” woman. In fact neither ideology has anything “modern” about it.

Competition leads to winners and losers, which leads to Social Darwinism, the application of a misreading of “survival of the fittest” to human societies. Basically, as applied to today’s societies, that means “you deserve what you get for being a success or a failure, and you shouldn’t be helped because that would mean rewarding failures.”

In capitalist theory, there is an ideal state of affairs (call it free market or voluntaryism or unfettered capitalism or what have you) where a person receives only exactly as much as they can contract for, and no more. Inconvenient things like social programs and safety nets, workers’ rights and unions, accessible education and health care, free access to air and water, and all the other pesky things neo-liberalists are constantly trying to eradicate, are a deviation from this ideal state.

So for instance, women make 82% of what men make on average in developed countries (the United States average is currently 81%, making gender income disparity one rare area where the United States is not dead last). Women were banned from entire industries (and still are, in some places). This is the “ideal” state of affairs and any attempt to correct it would be a “distortion.”

In practice, this belief serves the status quo. Men’s privilege over women is part of the backgrounds facts of capitalism, therefore it becomes part of the “ideal” state of affairs. “Survival of the fittest” is inherently unfair when some people are trained from childhood to be fitter than others.

So I think the issue with capitalism is not that it is woman-hating as such, but that it treat human beings as tools of production (human resources). It should not be too surprising that a system which objectifies all human beings is also unconcerned about objectifying women.

There is an ever-present danger that, because a given ideology is not explicitly woman-hating and preaches some form of equality (like equality of opportunities), we accept it as a “lesser evil.” But anything that keeps people from thinking about the way society is run is equally poisonous in the long run.

Nowhere do we see this more than in the pretense that feminism stands for “gender equality,” even though such equality is a logical impossibility because we live in a Patriarchy. Getting equal wages for men and women, or giving men and women the same opportunities or education, are laudable goals but they are not the objective of feminism, neither can they ensure “gender equality.”

Mixing one’s labor does not prove property rights!

A common justification for property rights given to us is that one deserves to acquire property by “mixing one’s labor” with natural resources. It is this “mixing” which magically turns a resource from a property. This formulation comes to us from John Locke:

Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.

I’ve already debunked self-ownership, so I won’t say anything further on Locke’s false assumption that “every man has a property in his own person.” Also note what we now call the Lockean proviso, “enough and as good,” which is another point of contention. But this entry is not about either of these things, so I will merely mention them here.

What concerns me is more specifically the belief that mixing one’s labor is a sufficient condition for turning a resource into property, from something small and consumed such as an apple to an entire piece of land:

As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common.

Locke believed that the proviso ensured that no one would be deprived because there has to still be “enough and as good” for everyone else. But even that is besides the point. The point here is, what is this magical transmutation that turns a piece of land into property?

In Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon debunks the concept of property. He specifically refutes the argument that property is the result of mixing one’s labor:

I maintain that the possessor is paid for his trouble and industry in his doubled crop, but that he acquires no right to the land. “Let the laborer have the fruits of his labor.” Very good; but I do not understand that property in products carries with it property in raw material. Does the skill of the fisherman, who on the same coast can catch more fish than his fellows, make him proprietor of the fishing-grounds? Can the expertness of a hunter ever be regarded as a property-title to a game-forest?…

To change possession into property, something is needed besides labor, without which a man would cease to be proprietor as soon as he ceased to be a laborer. Now, the law bases property upon immemorial, unquestionable possession; that is, prescription. Labor is only the sensible sign, the physical act, by which occupation is manifested. If, then, the cultivator remains proprietor after he has ceased to labor and produce; if his possession, first conceded, then tolerated, finally becomes inalienable, — it happens by permission of the civil law, and by virtue of the principle of occupancy.

He also argues that if the principle that labor-mixing led to property was valid, it could only lead to equality of property:

Admit, however, that labor gives a right of property in material. Why is not this principle universal? Why is the benefit of this pretended law confined to a few and denied to the mass of laborers?…

If the laborer, who adds to the value of a thing, has a right of property in it, he who maintains this value acquires the same right. For what is maintenance? It is incessant addition, — continuous creation. What is it to cultivate? It is to give the soil its value every year; it is, by annually renewed creation, to prevent the diminution or destruction of the value of a piece of land. Admitting, then, that property is rational and legitimate, — admitting that rent is equitable and just, — I say that he who cultivates acquires property by as good a title as he who clears, or he who improves; and that every time a tenant pays his rent, he obtains a fraction of property in the land entrusted to his care, the denominator of which is equal to the proportion of rent paid. Unless you admit this, you fall into absolutism and tyranny; you recognize class privileges; you sanction slavery.

Obviously libsocs do not dispute that a person owns the product of their labor, but disagree that one can claim a piece of land as property and thus demand rent from anyone else deciding to mix their labor with that land. Proudhon makes clear that the reality of land ownership has no relation with labor-mixing, since one can own a piece of land and stop laboring on it, either by sitting on it or by hiring others to do it instead. This leads to rent and the inherent contradictions of “property.”

Proudhon was talking about the cultivation of land, but this rebuttal of labor-mixing applies to capitalist work contracts as well. From ethicist Brian Zamulinski:

Now, suppose that two people work together. Although it may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the shares of the two in the product in practice, if people acquire property by mixing their labour with things, it must be the case that each owns a share proportional to the labour performed that actually went into the product. Otherwise, one is appropriating the property of the other.

If one of the two is the employee of the other, the problem is that the share that the employee receives will be determined not by the amount of labour he contributes but by competition with other potential employees, assuming that there is freedom of contract. Occasionally, he will receive proportionally more than he should but other times, he will receive proportionally less. The latter outcome will occur far more frequently than the former. Either way, the employee will almost never get what he deserves in light of the labour-mixing theory of property acquisition. It will be a fortunate accident if he does.

Zamulinski goes on to rightly point out that the end product of capitalist work contracts is incompatible with labor-mixing theory, and that in order to make any sense of their own position, capitalists must logically abandon labor-mixing as their justification for property. In this he again joins Proudhon. I don’t know if Zamulinski believes there is any valid justification for property, but Proudhon definitely did not, at least at the time he wrote Qu’est-ce que la Propriété? (his opinions did change quite a bit as his thought evolved).

No such thing as market failure?

The concept of market failure divides the two kinds of capitalists, the extremist capitalists (free market fanatics) and the moderate capitalists (or as they like to call themselves, the “progressives”). “Progressives” (a code-word for moderate capitalists) vaguely understand that the free market is suspicious, although they couldn’t tell you why beyond “because there are poor people and somebody’s responsible.” They believe that markets usually work but that they can experience periods of failure which are caused by monopolies or some other lack of competition, the free rider problem, externalities, lax “property rights,” and so on. Extremists, on the other hand, don’t believe in market failure; they do believe that lax “property rights” are bad for business, but that such a cause is not part of the market proper.

I should probably specify that I am using the term “markets” in the same way capitalists do, as an economic system where supply and prices are mostly fixed by giant corporations.

Why don’t they believe that there can be such a thing as market failure? Extremists believe that markets always “work,” and they determine that they “work” based on a view of trade in a vacuum. They posit a situation where a person X buys something from a person Y, person X having decided that ey would benefit from buying the object at that price, and person Y having decided that ey would benefit from selling the object at that price. The conclusion is that any trade is necessarily to the advantage of both parties, since value-judgment is subjective and they both subjectively believe they have gained from the exchange.

Obviously there is a great deal wrong with this picture. For one thing, value-judgment is not subjective and therefore one cannot conclude that a person’s opinion of their interests necessarily proves that they are acting in their own interests, since people can be mistaken about what’s in their interests. There is no clear reason to believe why our beliefs about our own interests must be infallible, which is the logical consequence of believing that value-judgments are subjective.

But by far the most important, you could say all-encompassing, problem with this scenario is that it posits that trade exists in a contextless vacuum. In reality, person X and person Y operate under pre-existing conditions which force them to a certain extent to act in certain ways. In reality, price is not determined by dialogue between two people, but usually by organizations of disproportionate power compared to any individual. In reality, a person’s value-judgments are distorted by the pressures operating on one’s life.

Let’s take one random, innocuous example, like a person deciding what kind of vegetables to buy at the grocery store. The price was not set by a dialogue, but by a group of people setting price points in accordance with policies enacted by their superiors. The “choice” of the customer is not based on some abstract comparison of preferences between that amount of money and the product, but is mediated by one’s economic status. It is also dependent on what stores are available to the consumer (if ey lives in a food desert, for example), on how much cooking one has the time to do, on dietary or ethical restrictions. Finally, the whole system is contingent upon the nature of the food supply, what the stores put on their shelves, marketing and consumerism, the exploitation of the workers involved in the food supply, the application of mass murder (e.g. the Chiquita Death Squads, the massacres involved in extracting the fuel that is used to transport the produce), and so on.

Taken to its logical extent, the context of any given trade is the totality of everyone’s work and of all relations between people, at the individual and the geo-political level. If you want to be poetic, you could say that any exchange embodies the entire world.

Let’s move on to a logical consequence of exploiting food for profit, which is starvation. According to the capitalist narratives, people deserve to starve because they don’t contribute enough value to the market through their labor. Of course this is completely false from an ethical standpoint: no one deserves to starve; but it is also false from a factual standpoint. In general, we observe that the return people get on their labor is not dependent on the value they contribute, but rather on education. People who work hard, who extract the resources upon which we all depend, make less. People involved in less demanding work requiring a high level of education, which can only be attained through privileged families or crumbs given by the privileged, make more.

I have argued so far that the narrative presented by capitalists to justify the contradiction of market failure is invalid, but I still don’t subscribe to the concept of market failure. To understand why, you simply have to examine what this term “market failure” implies. The word “failure” implies that there is such a thing as a “successful market” or “well-functioning market.” The extremist position is that markets are always well-functioning, the moderate position is that markets are well-functioning most of the time, and my position is that markets are never well-functioning.

The very nature of a market can be expressed succinctly as “profits before people.” The primary drive for economic activity is to generate as much surplus value as possible, and that our economic units are set up and structured with this goal as sole standard. And because in a capitalist society money is power and money is status, workers likewise value money over other people. As a consequence, modern capitalist markets are inherently, and virulently, anti-egalitarian to the point of slavery, mass murder and torture.

I have seen the objection that, while profit is important, it’s not the only objective one can have in a market. I don’t dispute that, but extensive practical experience around the world teaches us that any economic unit set up along socialist lines will rapidly drown or forever teeter on the brink of drowning. Acting ethically costs extra money, and extra costs cut into surplus value, which affects the viability of any business. The only way to flourish is to compromise. This is not, I think, particular to capitalism: I expect that trying to go counter to the values of a local economic system, whatever it is, would be very difficult; I imagine a giant capitalist corporation would fare very poorly in a society where economic equality is mandated and enforced.

Note that I am not making any argument about efficiency here, or trying to argue that capitalism represents efficiency and that socialism represents fairness (although I do think the latter is true). Competition as a driving principle is extremely wasteful, and capitalism is no exception to this rule:

Many goods and services once made in the US and western Europe for those markets are now produced elsewhere and transported back to them. That wastes resources spent on the costly relocation and consequent return transportation. The pollution (of air, sea and soil) associated with vast transportation networks – and the eventual cleaning up of that pollution – only enlarges that waste.

The factories, offices and stores abandoned by departing capitalist corporations increase the waste of resources and of workers’ lives. In the surrounding communities, tax bases eroded by capitalists’ departures mean reduced social services, public spaces, and qualities of life for all but the richest. Those vast wastes of resources and damages to lives offset whatever small efficiency gains corporate relocations only sometimes achieve…

Efficiency did not and does not deliver what its supporters claim. That is because efficiency was not and is not what drives capitalists’ decisions. The structure of a capitalist economy – exclusive power in the hands of major shareholders and boards of directors, competitions, tensions, and unequal resources among enterprises, shareholders, directors, managers, and workers – drives the decisions made by shareholders and directors. Those decisions primarily advance capitalists’ interests in greater profits, growth and market shares.

Within the totalizing worldview of the free market extremists, the free market is the ultimate solution to everything. These just so stories usually rely on a misunderstanding of the Tragedy of the Commons mixed in with starry-eyed fantasies about the intentions of business owners (i.e. that they pursue some other objective than profit). So we get told, despite all the contrary evidence of history, that the market can magically solve the problem of bigotry because there’ll always be some corporation ready to snag workers who are discriminated against and to offer them better working conditions, since corporations compete against each other for workers. The market can also solve environmental issues because corporations have an interest in maintaining natural resources, unlike non-market societies, where people just try to get as much money out of the resource before it’s depleted by everyone else (which actually sounds more like the way capitalism deals with natural resources than anything else that has ever existed in history).

From the extremist perspective, we have never had a free market because of State intervention, and this is a regrettable fact. From the moderate perspective, we have a free market but that freedom must be balanced with the needs of the State. Both positions are predicated on the error of believing that the market and the State have contrary aims. But the State is the handmaiden of the power elite, which is mostly composed of market leaders and policy leaders; their aims are not, on the whole, contrary. Political conflicts are almost alwasy between ultra-conservative and moderate conservative factions of the power elite (for more on this, see Who Rules America? by G. William Domhoff).

A free market, in the sense of a market being completely unregulated, has never existed and will never exist, since it would collapse into itself in short order. All modern large-scale markets crucially depend upon the infrastructure, the subsidies, the laws (including “property rights”) and the indoctrination provided by the State. This applies as much to the most abstract financial transactions as to two individuals exchanging an object for money, but obviously to the former to a much, much greater extent.

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