I like my life, therefore antinatalism is false!

There seems to be a trend in criticism of antinatalism, in that critics are actually now taking the time to understand what antinatalism is all about, but they still can’t confront the arguments. This makes their criticism a lot stranger: why take the time to understand antinatalism if you’re unable to confront it anyway? It is absolutely useless for them to be able to describe antinatalist arguments completely accurately if they are unable to deal with the arguments or provide a reasoned reaction to them.

Artir, of the blog Nintil, has written an overlong rebuttal to antinatalism called Pollyanna über alles: A critique of antinatalism. Now before I begin, I want to point out that Artir is not quite right in the head. What are we to make of someone who seriously writes: “someone who is never sad like me” and that “what follows is an argument from non-self-deluded, cheerful Pollyannaist optimist”? Why would anyone describe themselves in this way?

Anyway, as I said, the rebuttal is extremely long, but I will not address most of it here. My position is that the basic argument used by Artir is absolutely wrong, and therefore there is no point in addressing the corollaries of Artir’s reasoning. So let me go straight to Artir’s argument.

First, he defines “UAPR” (“universal a priori antinatalism”), but that’s just his term for antinatalism. He also uses two other terms, UAPO (“universal a posteriori antinatalism”) and “individual a posteriori antinatalism,” which have nothing to do with antinatalism. Antinatalism is nothing more than the position that procreation is wrong. How you justify that proposition is irrelevant to the fact that you are an antinatalist, and you cannot say that an antinatalist must justify their antinatalism in certain ways. I think this is an attempt by Artir to single out the Asymmetry as a particularly extreme argument.

Talking about that, the Asymmetry is what Artir singles out. He seems to erroneously believe that refuting the Asymmetry proves that “UAPR” (i.e. what we call antinatalism) is wrong. This, of course, is false: there are plenty of other antinatalist arguments which are not based on the Asymmetry, and Artir fails to address any of those. Again we see this obsession with the Asymmetry that so many critics seem to have, possibly because it’s the argument on which Benatar spends the most time in his book. And yet, despite this obsession, the Asymmetry still has not been logically refuted.

Artir’s argument is the following:

1. My life is nice
2. Not bringing me into existence wouldn’t have allowed me to have such a good life, or a life at all
3. If you can cause me to exist by pressing a button – a small cost to yourself – you ought to do it. Failing to do so will mean that I wouldn’t enjoy my life
4. Hence, there is one life that is worth starting, and for which we have a duty to start it
5. But this contradicts UAPR
6. Hence, UAPR is wrong…

The antinatalist will criticise my premise 1 with arguments for UAPA, saying that my life is not that good. I’ll answer that later. The second premise will be criticise by means of the Asymmetry, so to it I turn. Premise three seems trivially true if one accepts even a minimalistic conception of positive duties.

I have no interest in denying premise 1 or 2. I really have no idea if Artir’s life is nice or not, but I’ll take his word for it. I have no idea why he thinks antinatalists would criticize premise 2, because it is almost trivially true. Not bringing a potential person into existence means that potential person will not become actual and have a lifespan. There is no disagreement possible on this point.

No, the only premise that is clearly false, and which antinatalists such as myself will criticize, is premise 3. Premise 3 is not at all trivially true, and in fact it is rather bizarre that someone would argue this, especially after considering criticisms for premise 2, which is actually trivially true. Logic is not Artir’s strong suit, to say the least.

Apart from the idea that we have an obligation to bring about enjoyable lives, a point which I will argue with the next quote, there are still many things wrong with the argument. For one thing, we do not come to exist at a minuscule cost equivalent to pressing a button. Since this is part of one of the premises, this means that his argument only proves that antinatalism is wrong if procreation comes at a minuscule cost. But it very clearly does not, therefore the argument does not refute antinatalism. Furthermore, as I said before, this argument does not refute other antinatalist arguments such as the misanthropic arguments, the risk argument, the teleological argument, the ecological arguments, the feminist arguments I’ve presented on this blog, and so on. So this argument fails to disprove antinatalism (of the “universal a priori” kind or otherwise).

As for the obligation to bring about enjoyable lives, Artir argues as follows:

I disagree that there anything special regarding a duty not to bring people into existence. Duties are mostly negative (To avoid harming), and a few are positive (beneficence). This stems from the idea that we ought not interfere with the life-plans of other and let them live their lives as they want. However, there is no pre-existing life-plan to interfere with in the case of unborn people. But if a new person is generated such that the person comes to regret its existence, then we would have wronged that person, for we would have put that person through a life that was not asked for, so it would still be wrong.

That said, if we accept that we have a broad duty of beneficence (to do good to others), then one way of discharging that duty is bringing more people into existence. Creating people who will be satisfied with their lives is a good thing.

What antinatalists are saying is that there is no universal duty to provide pleasure, and therefore the pleasures of life do not provide an obligation to bring about new lives. The duty of beneficence is about our duty to prevent others from suffering due to their position in society or their specific situation. This makes absolutely no sense in the context of procreation, because there is no human being there whose suffering we can prevent. The duty of beneficence therefore cannot disprove antinatalism.

I think Artir confused “duty of beneficence” with “duty to do good for others.” It is very clear that no one should believe in the latter idea, and anyone who says otherwise is pure evil: if we have a duty to provide anything that others find morally good, no matter what it is and no matter what moral evaluation we give it, that means we have a duty to do anything from having sex (i.e. being raped) to killing their enemies. I think it should very, very clear that no such duty could possibly be justified. We have a duty as a society to help others who are worse off or in danger, but we do not have a universal duty to do good to others.

That being the case, we have disproven premise 3 of his argument. I cannot have any obligation or duty to help conceive any given person on the basis of expected pleasures, because I have no obligation or duty to give other people pleasure (except if I create such an obligation for myself, and myself only, which clearly does not apply here since this is about Artir telling us that we have that obligation). The only universal duties that can exist are negative, duties which enjoin us to not harm others in some way and/or to prevent harm in some way.

Just to clarify a possible source of confusion, when I say we have no universal positive duties, this is not related to “negative rights” and “positive rights.” We do clearly have “positive rights,” because any conception of human rights is meaningless or empty without them. But human rights as a whole pertain to what we’d call negative duties. We have no human right to be given pleasure or satisfaction.

The idea that “we ought not interfere with the life-plans of other” (sic), but that this does not apply in the case of unborn people, is true. But while it may be true that procreation does not interfere with the future person’s life-plan, this is because there are still no values to protect, and there will not be any values to protect until the child is born. Therefore, the life-plan of the future person, whether it includes pleasure or suffering, is used in these arguments as a purely selfish factor: ultimately, it is the values of the parents which are being furthered by the act of procreation, no one else’s. So while the argument is technically true, it is also very conceited and selfish. At any rate, the consent argument takes care of it.

He also tries to validate his positive duty in another way, and to dispatch the consent argument as well:

Suppose you have a magic fist such that if you punch people in their arm you cause them to have greater intelligence, and be able to enjoy a range of pleasures that they weren’t enjoying before (Say, understanding quantum mechanics, learning History, and doing phlosophy). Furthermore, assume that people who have been punched in the past have all almost unanimously been glad to be punched. Is there anything wrong with you randomly punching people?

I argue that no, and in fact you have a duty -as part of a duty of beneficence – to punch people in the arm to improve their lives.

This case, however, is not totally analogous. You could obtain consent. Although in this particular case, the fact that most people are glad to have undergone the procedure could perhaps defeat consent, in a similar way to how parents impose certain rules to their kids, on grounds that they will come to see them as justified, because in the present they don’t have enough information to understand their choice. (If however, they manifested enough knowledge of the relevant information, then their consent would trump our duty to punch).

For non-beings, they consent via hypothetical consent. Had they been able to say yes, they would have. We can know this by asking people.

So this is what it comes down to: “hypothetical consent.” The belief in hypothetical consent is pure fantasy, it is only an imaginary construct, but it partakes of the same psychology as the imperialists who believe that bombing some brown people into the Stone Age to “liberate” them is justified by “hypothetical consent,” because they would consent if they knew just how great it is to be bombed until you’re “liberated.” In both cases, what we have is a person with high levels of belief in their own superiority: in the case of imperialists, in their mode of government, in the case of natalists, in the greatness of their own lives.

I have examined the view that we can assume consent by asking people if they are happy with their lives, as well as “hypothetical consent,” as expressed by our favourite natalist stooge Bryan Caplan. I am not aware of any survey asking people if they would have consented to be born, nor how anyone could imagine such a state (apart from using Rawls’ Original Position argument). Either way, even if someone said “if I was able to communicate as a fetus, I would have consented to be born,” that evaluation would be based on their current life, not on a hypothetical point of view as a fetus. People want to continue to live because they have accumulated values, desires and attachments, all things which our hypothetical fetus would not have.

Artir posits that you can just omit consent completely if you want to do things to people that most people are glad to have undergone. But this is just cultural relativism, plain and simple. Suppose, for example, that most people in a society are fundamentalist Christians and believe that it is better for them to die than to become atheists and be condemned to Hell. Would it therefore be fine to not ask an atheist for consent before killing them, because that’s what most people would want done to themselves? Or to take a real life example, was it ethical to burn widows to death by sati without their consent, because that was the accepted belief of a large majority of the population? What about female circumcision?

Now clearly, punching people to raise their intelligence is nowhere analogous to killing people or circumcising little girls. And I have no doubt that most people would consent to such a punch-based procedure (including myself!). That’s precisely what consent is for: to obtain permission from others to act upon them, whether you consider the act morally good or bad. The fact that most people would agree with it would not thereby nullify consent, since the act is still an act performed upon other people, and there is no prior justification to impose it on anyone else. If such justification exists, Artir has not told us what it is, his confusion about beneficence aside (which has generally little to do with raising people’s intelligence, and definitely has nothing to do with giving people new pleasures).

In that narrow sense, it is perhaps more similar to male circumcision (a topic on which I have an upcoming entry). Many advocates claim that male circumcision has some health benefits. Whether that is true or not, however, does not evacuate the issue of consent. The fact remains that, health benefit or not, the newborn does not have the ability to consent to such a dangerous procedure (especially when administered by some ignorant clergy).

While childism is not the topic of this entry, Artir brings it up when he uses children as an example. The fact that we accept childism (that children are inferior and need to be controlled by parents) and see this as normal is due to the fact that a large majority of people accept it, not because it is actually valid. I don’t really want to get into the childism issue because it’s rather off-topic and would take a lot more space than I want to use to address a single example (my entries on the subject can be read in this category), but my basic point here is that it follows the same relativist pattern I’ve already highlighted. The parents’ will, or their imaginary belief that the child would consent if they were fully informed, does not trump consent, because children are human beings who have the right, like all other human beings, not to be invaded upon without some higher justification (e.g. pulling a child out of the street, or preventing a child from getting burned).

Since Artir’s argument centers around the premise that we have an obligation or duty to bring about a life if that life would contain pleasures, the failure of his demonstration of “positive duties” also means that his argument as a whole fails. Therefore, as I stated at the beginning, I see no point in delving in his long rebuttal to the quality of life argument, since he does so for the sole purpose of shoring up premise 1, a maneuver which is entirely unnecessary in the first place and which, at any rate, cannot save his argument. As it happens, I do think his rebuttal to the quality of life argument so bizarre and delusional as to not deserve a response; he does explicitly call himself a self-deluded Pollyanna, so perhaps there are no surprises here, but it makes his argument useless cheerleading, about as valid as sports fans arguing which of their favourite team is the best (“Which team is the human race?” “Both.” “Duh.”).

18 thoughts on “I like my life, therefore antinatalism is false!

  1. David March 17, 2017 at 21:03


  2. If you can cause me to exist by pressing a button – a small cost to yourself – you ought to do it. Failing to do so will mean that I wouldn’t enjoy my life

    – implicitly assuming that, that is a bad thing which it is not. Thats the whole point of asymmetry argument.
    You can’t refute an argument by a rebuttal having premises based on contradictory implicit assumptions just by giving them axiomatic treatment.

    Secondly, the trap in the consent argument is the degree of cost. A “punch in the arm” seems conveniently toned downed cost as against the actual suffering even the best possible lives have to go through. An argument which is standing on the crutches of “hypothetical consent” collapses if “punch in the arm” is replaced by “amputating the arm” or something even severe like an unhealable and perpetually painful wound. Such a replacement is also not out of scale in comparison with actual suffering and risks life involves.

  3. Dean March 19, 2017 at 10:27

    Just a question François. Do you really think that there’s no duty to make someone happy?
    That would imply that parents don’t have a duty to make their children who are already born happy? Should they let a child die of boredom rather than providing means for the child’s entertainment and happiness? Or is morality all about preventing harm and suffering?

    • Francois Tremblay March 19, 2017 at 14:31

      “Do you really think that there’s no duty to make someone happy?”


      “That would imply that parents don’t have a duty to make their children who are already born happy? Should they let a child die of boredom rather than providing means for the child’s entertainment and happiness? Or is morality all about preventing harm and suffering?”

      Parents have a duty to provide to a child whatever means they need to grow up in a healthy manner, both physically and mentally. That doesn’t mean they have to make them happy. Whether the child is happy or not is no indication of whether that duty has been discharged. I would rather talk about well-being or flourishing than something as wonky as happiness.

    • Boredom is a horrible form of suffering. Providing a child entertainment is just a way to reduce that.

      The point really is in the fact that almost all ‘apparently essential’ happiness is just a satisfaction of some kind of deprivation, reduction of some kind of suffering. If no such deprivation or suffering exists(which it doesn’t before birthing a child), there is no duty to provide satisfaction.

      • Lindsey Wagners April 18, 2017 at 17:45

        Almost all? I say ALL. I know of no happiness or contentment (or any good feeling, for that matter) that is not merely the feeling of a previous need-desire-deprivation being relieved. Do you?

  4. Boredom is a horrible form of suffering. Providing a child’s entertainment is just a way to reduce that.

    The point really is in the fact that almost all ‘apparently essential’ happiness is just a satisfaction of some kind of deprivation, reduction of some kind of suffering. If no such deprivation or suffering exists(which it doesn’t before birthing a child), there is no duty to provide satisfaction.

  5. Artir March 20, 2017 at 06:18

    Hi Francois,

    I just read through your post and as you might expect I quite disagree with most of what you said. I will reply during the coming days, even though you have said you wouldn’t write further replies to me. Thanks anyway, as so far only you have engaged with the post and cared to write a reply.

    Minor question: You identify me as Nintil writing at the Nintil blog. But my entries are signed as Artir, and I indicate that my pseudonym is Artir in the About section. I ask because this is not the first time that it happens, and I’m curious about why I am being identified with the name of my blog. I’m inclined to suppose that because many personal blogs share the name of the author

    Kind Regards,


    • Francois Tremblay March 20, 2017 at 14:16

      Great. I don’t care that you disagree with me, though. But I will change every instance of Nintil to Artir. Thanks for notifying me.

  6. The Laughable Cheese March 22, 2017 at 22:34

    I am not anti natilism. But i am not well researched on the topic, I am mainly going on my feeling here, sorry for the lack of education on the subject.

    Though I agree that people suffer. Though I have watched talks on it i believe by the philosophers famous for that. I do in part agree to the pointlessness of human existence. But then again maybe we are evolving into a species that can have a point. Which is why we have to keep having babies so someone can discover it and bring meaning to our race, which maybe everyone needs and thus would help suffering on a larger scale then the cost of new people existing.

    some arguments:
    0. the people here are not happy and they are suffering.. so they either do something about it or do not do something.
    What could they do?
    They could procreate in order to see if the offspring can find the solution to human problems.
    And if they don’t?
    The children grow up to suffer. The pattern continues.
    1. In our DNA is the imperative to have children. Do we have a right to go against the code within our own selves?
    2. If suffering between one person and another is equivalent, both between people born and not born.
    Then it is both right to have children for the sake of the society and it is not okay.
    And they cancel each other out such that it doesn’t matter either way.
    3. Suffering. Maybe it’s not a bad thing. Sometimes it’s talked about as a way to add strength. Sometimes things feel good and bad at the same time. Suffering is not a clear term.
    Then again as mentioned, neither is joy.
    4. We cannot measure pain in another person. From one person to another. We probably by that token cannot measure joy either. So we cannot really say if this world is suffering or not.

    • Francois Tremblay March 22, 2017 at 22:55

      “I am not anti natilism. But i am not well researched on the topic, I am mainly going on my feeling here, sorry for the lack of education on the subject.”

      Well, if you ever do want to read materials on the subject, you’re in the right place. I have a category for all my AN entries:

      “Though I agree that people suffer. Though I have watched talks on it i believe by the philosophers famous for that. I do in part agree to the pointlessness of human existence. But then again maybe we are evolving into a species that can have a point. Which is why we have to keep having babies so someone can discover it and bring meaning to our race, which maybe everyone needs and thus would help suffering on a larger scale then the cost of new people existing.”

      There’s no reason to bring new lives into this world, but maybe some future person will come up with a reason, so we should keep doing it anyway? I’m not sure if that’s a circular argument or an argument from ignorance. Either way, it’s a logical fallacy.

      • The Laughable Cheese March 23, 2017 at 10:54

        alright I will read the articles and maybe get back to this.

  7. Elayne June 29, 2017 at 05:42

    Hello, Francois– the antinatalism movement is new to me– in the past couple of weeks I’ve read Benatar’s books, Sarah Perry’s Every Cradle is a Grave, and Ligotti’s Conspiracy against the Human Race– trying to get my mind around the ideas. Perry’s book was the most compelling so far, especially at the end where she talks about losing her story. I still do have some trouble reducing all of this to logic, and perhaps I’m just not going to be able to do that. I am aware that I’m a pretty extreme subjectivist who has a hard time with hypotheticals as opposed to a sort of “every case is a special case” approach. I’m past child-bearing age, so antinatalism isn’t personally going to affect my decisions, but it seems like a subject one ought to consider seriously.

    Despite trying to consider abstract reasons for doing this or that thing, in the end I notice that’s probably not the basis for my decisions. I think the research that humans mainly make decisions emotionally, whether we know it or not, with reason as an evolved overlay with explanatory/ persuasive fitness advantages rather than a true decision-making tool, fits me pretty well. For instance, I never could come up with a hypothetical reason to marry and plenty of reasons not to. I felt no lack of a marriage partner, I considered myself happy single, I wasn’t looking for a partner, and I would have just gone on as a single person, except that I met my husband in the specific 31 years ago, which changed everything.

    I understand that the asymmetry argument is not the only one, but it seems important, and it is the argument I’m having the most trouble with. Again, that might have to do with my poor grasp of using logic for decision-making. I was going to see if I could ask Sarah Perry on her blog, but it doesn’t appear to be active, and in poking around, I found yours.

    I agree that there is no positive duty to provide happiness to others. However, that seems different to me from how we assess the “goodness” of providing happiness to others. I have no duty to run into a burning building to save another person, even if I think I can do it without extreme risk to myself– however, if I do and the person wanted to be saved, most people would say what I did was good– even heroic, above and beyond duty. Which means to me that the asymmetry argument only addresses duty and doesn’t work without being able to say whether life is valued and wanted by those who are alive, despite suffering. If life is experienced as a positive good, then giving birth at risk to oneself (always the case) could still be considered heroic. Not a duty but still a good action. The idea that we would be somehow required to pop out as many babies as possible (as Benatar suggests) if life is good– that seems silly to me, not only because there is no positive duty but because childbirth is painful and risky, in addition to putting an ongoing burden on parents (which for them may or may not be countered by pleasure). The asymmetry doesn’t address the sum of the goodness. Even if life were very minimally unpleasant and overwhelmingly good, the asymmetry would still be present and wouldn’t really answer the question of what would be good to do (as opposed to what we have a duty to do or even what is merely permissible).

    In considering whether I personally would be willing to sacrifice by having a life of pure suffering in order for others to enjoy happiness, I know that I have entered into temporary suffering for the sake of helping others, so it is possible that I might make such an extreme altruistic choice– but it is such a hypothetical that I doubt I can be accurate in knowing what I would do. If I knew my suffering would be awful but would have an end, as all of us do in death, I think I might be willing to do it. But is it right to expect someone else to make that choice– or accept that choice made by others, which is really what happens– for my sake or for others who are glad for their lives? Or even to take a small risk? It doesn’t seem so, because they don’t have that duty, even though I’d be grateful for their heroic action.

    That seems an asymmetry argument too, but a bit different from Benatar’s, unless I’m misunderstanding him.

    • Elayne June 29, 2017 at 10:36

      And, follow up… a more clear-cut way of thinking about it, for me, than Benatar’s asymmetry, is simply whether I should be willing to take even the slightest chance of causing harm to a future human by bringing one into existence who would rather not have been born and who suffers only pain without any redeeming experiences. Knowing that this HAS happened to humans in the past makes it a real possibility. Even if the vast majority of humans were extremely happy, which I know is not true, taking a small chance of torturing someone with a ghastly life does not seem ethical. I don’t see humans as abstract or interchangeable– helping even many others does not justify doing harm to even one person. Because of that, there really isn’t even a need to establish that unhappiness is widespread, I would think– all we would need to know is that we had a chance of doing severe harm.

      I believe I would volunteer myself to undergo suffering, if it were the only way to obtain happiness for even hypothetical others, even compared to nonexistence for all– not because I’m abstracting or interchanging myself with them but because that’s my moral intuition. I would be imagining specific, real people living happy lives because of my sacrifice, and I’d do it. I think. But I have no ethical right to impose that risk on another person and I have no way of obtaining advance consent.

      The thought process may be related to the trolley question. I’m one of the people who would probably freeze or try to throw myself on the tracks instead– I cannot imagine pushing a lever to cause one death to save a hundred others, because they are not interchangeable as mere numbers. I’ve read that sociopaths have a high rate of being able to abstract humans into numbers.

      So, I guess I am thinking your position is correct, for different reasons. I have had some hard times in life but overall am very glad to be here and am generally a happy person. However, I do not want to cause terrible suffering for even one future human in the group who wishes they had never been born. So, good thing I don’t have my ovaries anymore, lol

    • Francois Tremblay June 29, 2017 at 15:18

      I don’t think you quite understood the “saving other people” aspect. Saving someone from a burning building is not entered in the “providing pleasure” category, it’s entered in the “preventing suffering” (the suffering of burning alive) category. We, as a society, do have a duty to provide this service, but no random person has that duty personally, for the reason you already explained.

      Having children is not like rescuing someone from a burning building. Non-existing people have no suffering that needs to be prevented.

      I liked most of your posts, I just wanted to point this out.

  8. Matthew Kwak (navywalrus) October 22, 2017 at 13:38

    The whole argument for natalism is pretty much a question-begging argument, which is strange, because antinatalists aim their contempt at detractors for the very same thing antinatalists themselves are guilty of.

    • BrianL December 30, 2017 at 18:08

      Well, that’s not telling me much. What exactly are ANs guilty of?

      (Happy New Year, Francois!)

  9. BrianL December 30, 2017 at 18:19

    Most people can’t understand AN arguments because they predictably project their existence onto nonexistence, giving it qualities it doesn’t have, because there are none to have. It’s anthropomorphizing nonexistence, which nonexistence, by definition, clearly does not contain, as it contains nothing at all.

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